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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the current debate in the United States over proposals 
for increased U.S. military sales to China. The study first examines the back- 
ground of U.S.-China security ties since the Nixon Administration, and then 
sets forth the parameters of the current debate by noting a number of issues 
concerning U.S. military transfers to China on which all sides generally agree. 
It shows that Americans familiar with the issue tend to identify with different 
groups of opinion or "schools of thought" on the question of U.S. military 
transfers to China, and provides a detailed pro-con analysis of the issue. It 
concludes by noting cross pressures that are likely to greet U.S. policy makers 
as they grapple with this issue in the months ahead and offers an assessment 
of four policy options of possible use by U.S. policymakers. 
SUMMARY 
The rapid development of U.S. relations with the People's Republic 
of China (PRC) over the past few years has led to the establishment of 
* 
normal Sino-American economic and political relations and a recent Ameri- 
can willingness to sell some military support equipment and civilian 
technology with military applications to the PRC. Chinese leaders are 
pressing the United States to go further, notably to sell weapons and 
weapons-related technology to China. They are strongly supported by 
U.S. observers who judge that more U.S. military transfers to China 
are needed to meet current Chinese expectations that the U.S. will sell 
some weapons and weapons-related technology to China; to increase China's 
sense of security against the Soviet Union; and to consolidate U.S. 
political relations with China in anticipation of possible future Sino- 
American difficulties over Taiwan, U.S.-Soviet arms control and other 
matters. 
American proponents of increased transfers stress the growing 
need for closer Sino-American cooperation in the face of what is seen 
as Soviet expansionism abroad. ( A  few of them judge that the U.S. 
should soon follow military sales with other forms of security cooper- 
ation, leading ultimately to the establishment of a mutual security 
arrangement between the U.S. and China.) They acknowledge that although 
U.S. friends and allies in Asia may be unsettled by the transfers, this 
need not  work comple te ly  t o  American d i s advan t age ;  i t  might a c t u a l l y  
i n c r e a s e  U.S. l eve rage  over  some of t h o s e  s t a t e s ,  n o t a b l y  Japan .  The 
proponents  c l a im  t h a t  Moscow views c l o s e r  U.S.-PRC t i e s  a s  i n e v i t a b l e  
and t h a t  t h e  USSR i s  no t  l i k e l y  t o  a c t  r a s h l y  i n  d e a l i n g  w i th  e i t h e r  
China o r  t h e  United S t a t e s .  Limited U.S. t r a n s f e r s  t o  China a r e  s a i d  
t o  p r e sen t  no major impediment t o  
t a n t  a r e a s  a s  arms c o n t r o l .  
Recent t r e n d s  i n  t h e  t r i a n g u l  
U.S.-Soviet coope ra t i on  i n  such impor- 
a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  among t h e  United S t a t e s ,  
Sovie t  Union and China a r e  s een  by t h e  proponents  of i nc r ea sed  Sino- 
American m i l i t a r y  s a l e s  a s  f avo r ing  t h e i r  c a se .  P r e s s u r e  f o r  s a l e s  t o  
China i s  l i k e l y  t o  b u i l d  s o  long a s  U.S. r e l a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  Sovie t  Union 
remain more h o s t i l e  t han  c o o p e r a t i v e ,  U.S. r e l a t i o n s  w i th  China b u i l d  
toward g r e a t e r  f r i e n d s h i p ,  and Sino-Soviet  r e l a t i o n s  remain s t a l ema ted .  
The Chinese l e a d e r s  a r e  a l s o  l i k e l y  t o  con t inue  t o  p r e s s  f o r  U.S. m i l i t a r y  
s u p p l i e s .  
I nc r ea sed  m i l i t a r y  s a l e s  t o  China a r e  s t r o n g l y  opposed by o t h e r  
U.S. o b s e r v e r s .  Some b e l i e v e  t h a t  n e g o t i a t i o n s  wi th  Moscow a r e  a  b e t t e r  
way t o  d e a l  wi th  Sov ie t  power t han  c l o s e r  s t r a t e g i c  al ignment  w i th  China. 
Others  s e e  problems stemming from p o s s i b l e  l e a d e r s h i p  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  
China o r  exces s ive  Chinese e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f ,  o r  dependence on,  U.S. s u p p o r t ;  
o r  they  vo i ce  concern  over  t h e  r i s e  i n  Chinese i n f l u e n c e  and d e c l i n e  
i n  U.S. i n f l u e n c e  i n  Asia  t h a t  i s  expected t o  fo l l ow  U.S. arms s a l e s  t o  
China,  s t r e s s i n g  t h a t  China might use  i t s  new i n f l u e n c e  t o  b u l l y  i t s  
s m a l l e r  ne ighbor s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  Taiwan. 
In reaction to the U.S. sales, the Soviet Union might increase 
military pressure throughout China's periphery--a development that would 
likely affect negatively U.S. interests as tensions rose in Asia. Japan 
might feel compelled to adopt a more independent foreign policy that 
would not necessarily be in U.S. interests. U.S.-Soviet relations could 
clearly be affected, as the sales to China could lock the United States 
into a stridently anti-Soviet policy that would preclude progress in 
arms control negotiations or other important matters. 
The arguments of those opposed to the U.S. sales to China suggest that 
U.S. policy makers will be taking certain--possibly grave--risks if they 
decide to go ahead with more sales. In the absence of a clear definition 
of American objectives in developing security relations with China, such 
ties could well be misinterpreted by Chinese, Soviet, Japanese, Taiwanese 
or other interested leaders abroad, as well as by opinion leaders in the 
United States. Friends and foes alike could see the ties as affecting 
their interests in the extreme--misinterpretations that could lead to 
reactions with potentially negative consequences for the United States. 
If the Reagan Administration does decide to proceed with military sales 
to China, the likelihood of misinterpretation of that action could be substan- 
tially reduced if the United States took the current opportunity to define 
publicly a set of limited goals for American-China security ties that could 
command support at home, consolidate relations with China and still reassure 
U.S. friends and foes in Asia. This would necessitate a change in the 
American ~ractice during the past decade when U.S. policy makers kept 
their approaches to Sino-American security ties shrouded behind a veil of 
ambiguity and secrecy. 
CRS- ix 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................... iii 
SUMMARY ...................................................................... v 
........................................................... I . INTRODUCTION 1 
I1 . BACKGROUND ............................................................. 5 
................................................ I11 . PARAMETERS OF THE DEBATE 9 
.................................. . A Points of Agreement in the Debate 9 
............................ . 1 Chinese Capabilities and Intentions 9 
. .............................................. 2 Soviet Objectives 12 .................................. 3 . U.S. Interests and Objectives 13 
.................................... B . Implications for Current Policy 15 
IV . DIFFERING STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS AND CONTENDING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT ....... 17 
.................................... A . Differing Strategic Assumptions 18 
........ 1 . Soviet Expansion and Its Challenge to the United States 18 
2 . U.S. Ability to Deal with Soviet Power ......................... 19 .............. 3 . China's Utility in U.S. Competition with the USSR 21 
...................................... . B Contending Schools of Thought 23 
............. . V ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF U.S. MILITARY SALES TO CHINA 27 
........................................... A . Strategic Considerations 27 
......................................... B . Political-Economic Factors 31 
. ................................................... VI PROSPECTS AND OPTIONS 37 
............................................................... . VII APPENDIX 43  
......................... . I China's Defense Strategy and Force Posture 43  
. ............................................ A Strategic Programs 43  
B . General Purpose Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 4  
. ...................................... 1 Employment for Attack 4 4  
..................................... . 2 Employment for Defense 45 
3 . Ground Forces  .............................................. 46 
4 . A i r  Force .................................................. 47  
5 . A i r  Defense ............................................... 4 8  
6 . Navy ....................................................... 4 8  
.................................................. C . Modernizat ion 50 
.................................. I1 . The Sino-Soviet M i l i t a r y  Balance 51 
A . Ground Forces  ................................................... 51 
B . A i r  Forces  and A i r  Defense ...................................... 52 
C . Sino-Soviet Border War .......................................... 53 
V I I I  . SELECTED READINGS ..................................................... 57 
INCREASED U.S. MILITARY SALES TO CHINA:  ARGUMENTS AND ALTERNATIVES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sino-American r e l a t i o n s  reached a  new s t a g e  i n  l a t e  1980 a s  conten-  
d i n g  groups w i t h i n  and o u t s i d e  t h e  U.S. Government began a c t i v e l y  t o  
deba t e  i n  p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  whether  o r  no t  t h e  United S t a t e s  should  
t a k e  what i s  wide ly  s een  a s  t h e  next  s t e p  forward i n  deve lop ing  Sino- 
American f r i e n d s h i p :  t h e  s a l e  of weapons and weapons-related technology  
t o  China. The i s s u e  of  whether  o r  n o t  t o  proceed w i th  such s a l e s  i s  n o t  
on ly  of m i l i t a r y  s i g n i f i c a n c e  bu t  ha s  b roade r  p o l i t i c a l  impor tance  a s  
w e l l .  It h a s  d i r e c t  impact on a  c e n t r a l  q u e s t i o n  i n  U.S. f o r e i g n  pol icy--  
how f a r  should t h e  United S t a t e s  go i n  t r y i n g  t o  move c l o s e r  t o  China 
i n  o r d e r  t o  improve t h e  American i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR. 
Opinion has  ranged wide ly .  Some judge t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  a l r e a d y  
gone t o o  f a r  i n  m i l i t a r y  t i e s  w i th  China and should  s t o p  promptly.  O the r s  
g e n e r a l l y  a r e  s a t i s f i e d  wi th  t h e  c u r r e n t  p o l i c y  bu t  f i r m l y  r e s i s t  f u r t h e r  
development,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e .  S t i l l  o t h e r s  f a v o r  a  
g r adua l  i n c r e a s e  i n  such t r a n s f e r s  t o  China a s  an impor tan t  s t e p  l e a d i n g  
t o  t h e  format ion  of  a  Sino-American mutua l  s e c u r i t y  arrangement  a g a i n s t  
t h e  Sov ie t  Union. 
Congress iona l  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  deba t e  ha s  been s t r o n g  because  p r e s e n t  
law, n o t a b l y  t h e  Arms Export  Con t ro l  Ac t ,  would make t h e  s a l e s  of  arms 
and other military equipment to China subject to several restrictions 
directly involving the Congress. 1/ Interest in the debate has been 
increased by the election of a Republican Administration that receives 
divided counsel on the issue of military tranfers to China; and by recent 
international developments--notably the heightened Soviet military pressure 
on Poland, which has prompted press speculation that the U.S. would strengthen 
1/ Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) allows the 
congress to disapprove by concurrent resolution the transfer of any "major 
defense equipment" worth $7 million or more, or any other defense articles 
or services worth $25 million or more. Sections 38(b)(3) and 36(c) of the 
AECA regarding commercial transactions allow the Congress to disapprove 
by concurrent resolution transfers of "major defense equipment" valued 
at $100 million or more. Also regarding commercial transactions, under 
a new provision in P.L. 96-533, Section 38(a)(3) was created and gives 
the President discretionary authority to require that any defense article 
or service be subject to government-to-government sales restrictions such 
as those noted in section 36(b) above. 
At the same time, the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 620(£), would 
appear to limit the furnishing of U.S. grant military assistance to any 
Communist country unless the President issues a narrowly defined waiver. 
This section specifies that the President must determine and report to 
Congress that: such assistance is vital to U.S. security; the recipient 
country is not controlled by the international communist conspiracy; and 
such assistance will further promote the independence of the recipient 
country from international communism. The phrase "Communist country" 
expressly includes the P.R.C. 
Section 505(b) of the Act limits the ability of the President to 
grant defense articles at a cost in excess of $3 million in any fiscal 
year in the absence of a waiver by him. According to this section, the 
President must determine that the recipient country conforms to the prin- 
ciples of the U.N. Charter, that the articles transfered will be used to 
defend the country or the free world; that the recipient country is making 
reasonable efforts to build up its own defense, and that the increased 
ability of the recipient country to defend itself is important to the 
security of the United States. 
Regarding the possible sending of military advisors to China, Section 
515 of the Foreign Assistance Act states that no military assistance advi- 
sory group, military mission, or other organization of U.S military per- 
sonnel similar military advisory functions under the Act or 
the Arms Export Control Act may operate in a foreign country like China 
unless specifically authorized by Congress. 
military ties with China if Soviet forces took military action against 
the Polish regime or its labor unions. 2/ 
This study examines the current debate in the United States over 
proposals for increased U.S. military sales to China. Based on journal 
articles, press reports and other public pronouncements, as well as on 
interviews with over 30 U.S. foreign policy and defense specialists both 
in and out of government who have been closely involved in this issue, 
the study first examines, in Section 11, the background of U.S.-China 
security ties since the Nixon administration. Section I11 sets forth the 
parameters of the current debate by noting a number of issues concerning 
U.S. military transfers to China on which all sides generally agree. 
The consensus seen on these issues is shown to be particularly useful 
because it serves to narrow substantially the scope of the debate and 
reduces the number and the complexity of the pros and cons that must be 
considered by U.S. policy makers. 
The study shows in Section IV that Americans familiar with the issue 
tend to identify with different groups of opinion or "schools of thought 
on the question of U.S. military transfers to China. They do so largely 
on the basis of their differing strategic assumptions in regard to the 
U.S.-Soviet balance and China's current and potential role in that equati 
The section describes the schools of thought and gives examples of indi- 
vidual analysts identified with each group. 
Section V provides a detailed pro-con analysis of the issue while 
Section VI projects cross pressures that are likely to greet U.S. policy 
on. 
21 See press reports on Sen. Stevens visit to China seen in the 
washington Post, January 5, 1981. 
makers a s  t h e y  g rapp l e  w i th  t h i s  i s s u e  i n  t h e  months ahead and o f f e r s  
an assessment  of f ou r  p o l i c y  o p t i o n s  of  p o s s i b l e  use  by U.S. po l icymakers .  
The summary, which appea r s  a t  t h e  f r o n t  o f  t h e  s t u d y ,  c o n t a i n s  t h e  major  
f i n d i n g s  of  t h e  paper .  3 1  - 
A b a s i c  i n g r e d i e n t  i n  t he  c u r r e n t  deba t e  i nvo lves  Ch ina ' s  m i l i t a r y  
s t r e n g t h  and c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  v i s -a -v is  t h e  Sovie t  Union. 
Those u n f a m i l i a r  wi th  t h i s  s u b j e c t  may wish t o  c o n s u l t  t h e  appendix.  
3 1  For s e l e c t e d  r ead ings  on t he  i s s u e  of  U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  coopera- - 
t i o n ,  s e e  t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  of  t h i s  s t udy .  A s  t o  t h e  i n t e r v i e w s  wi th  U.S. 
s p e c i a l i s t s ,  t he  i n t e n t  was t o  e l i c i t  t he  v i ewpo in t s  o f  t h e s e  i n d i v i d u a l s  
i n  a s  f r a n k  a  manner a s  p o s s i b l e .  Given t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s e n s i t i v i t y  t h a t  
sur rounds  t h i s  i s s u e ,  i n d i v i d u a l s  wi th  whom t h e  au tho r  spoke were a s su red  
t h a t  t h e i r  comments would no t  be f o r  a t t r i b u t i o n .  
The au tho r  a l s o  r ece ived  suppor t  and impor tan t  i n s i g h t s  from s e v e r a l  
o f  h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  a t  t h e  L i b r a r y  of  Congress i n c l u d i n g  John C o l l i n s ,  Richard 
Cronin ,  Ron Dolan, F ranc i s  Miko, Lar ry  Niksch, Tommy Whi t ton ,  and Robert Worden, 
a s  we l l  a s  from David Raddock, an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s  s p e c i a l i s t  w i th  t h e  
Enserch Corpo ra t i on ,  Washington, D . C .  Carolyn Co lbe r t  o f  t h e  Congress iona l  
Research S e r v i c e  was r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  p r epa r ing  t h e  s t udy  f o r  p u b l i c a t i o n .  
4 /  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  measuring t h e  need f o r  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  
ch ina- f requent ly  depends on o n e ' s  assessment  of  Ch ina ' s  m i l i t a r y  s t r e n g t h  
v i s -a -v is  t h e  Sov ie t  Union. For i n s t a n c e ,  a  few o b s e r v e r s ,  who admit t o  
be ing  somewhat u n f a m i l i a r  w i th  Ch ina ' s  m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  have f ea r ed  
t h a t  China i s  so  weak v i s - a -v i s  t h e  Sov ie t  Union t h a t  i t  w i l l  soon succumb 
t o  Sov ie t  p r e s s u r e  u n l e s s  t he  U.S. q u i c k l y  t r a n s f e r s  m i l i t a r y  s u p p l i e s  t o  
t he  PRC. 
11. BACKGROUND 
Although deba t e  over  U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  t i e s  h a s  on ly  r e c e n t l y  
r e c e i v e d  prominent p u b l i c  a t t e n t i o n ,  t h e  r o o t s  o f  t h i s  d e b a t e  go back 
t o  t h e  Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,  when t h e  p ros  and cons of s eek ing  U.S.-China 
s e c u r i t y  c o o p e r a t i o n  were cons ide red  p r i o r  t o  s i g n i f i c a n t  U.S. i n i t i a t i v e s  
toward t h e  PRC. These i n i t i a t i v e s  i nc luded  t h e  Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
d e c i s i o n s  t o  s e l l  China a  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  ground s t a t i o n  des igned  t o  p i c k  
up and t r a n s m i t  t e l e v i s i o n  s i g n a l s  v i a  s a t e l l i t e ,  and s e v e r a l  Boeing 707 
a i r c r a f t  w i th  a t t e n d a n t  a e r o n a u t i c a l  t echnology;  and t h e  Ford A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
approva l  of t h e  s a l e  t o  China of ~ r i t i s h  R o l l s  Royce "Spey" a i r c r a f t  eng ines  
and r e l a t e d  technology  f o r  Ch ina ' s  f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t  program, and i t s  app rova l  
of t h e  s a l e  t o  China of an American computer t h a t  had p o t e n t i a l  m i l i t a r y  
a p p l i c a t i o n s .  Evidence of a  growing U.S.-China s e c u r i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
was a l s o  seen  i n  f r equen t  j o i n t  c o n s u l t a t i o n s  of Chinese and American 
o f f i c i a l s  on g l o b a l  and r e g i o n a l  m i l i t a r y  i s s u e s ,  arms c o n t r o l  and o t h e r  
s e c u r i t y  m a t t e r s ,  and i n  r epea t ed  American c l a i m s  t h a t  i t  would s t r o n g l y  
oppose any Sov ie t  e f f o r t  t o  dominate o r  e s t a b l i s h  "hegemony1' ove r  China.  
The C a r t e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  cont inued  t h i s  p r i m a r i l y  symbolic i n t e r c h a n g e  
d u r i n g  v i s i t s  o f  S e c r e t a r y  Vance and D r .  B rzez in sk i  t o  China i n  August 1977 
and May 1978, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The Admin i s t r a t i on  t ook  o t h e r  s t e p s  t h a t  i n c r e -  
m e n t a l l y  i nc r ea sed  Sino-American s e c u r i t y  t i e s .  For example, no t  o n l y  d i d  
American l e a d e r s  r e p e a t e d l y  v o i c e  suppor t  f o r  Chinese s e c u r i t y  a g a i n s t  
Sov ie t  "hegemony," bu t  t hey  began i n  1978 t o  s t r e s s  American backing  f o r  a  
"s trongl1 a s  we l l  a s  f o r  a  "secure"  China. 
American w a r s h i p s  c a l i e d  on Hong Kong, which Pek ing  r e g a r d s  a s  p a r t  
of Ch ina ,  and r e c e i v e d  C h i n e s e  communist o f f i c i a l s  f o r  w e l l - p u b l i c i z e d  
v i s i t s .  The Uni ted  S t a t e s  a l s o  a d o p t e d  a  more l i b e r a l  a t t i t u d e  toward  
t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  t e c h n o l o g y  t o  C h i n a ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e  a l l o w i n g  
China  t o  p u r c h a s e  s p e c i a l  U.S. g e o l o g i c a l  s u r v e y  equipment  and n u c l e a r  
power p l a n t  t e c h n o l o g y .  Of more i m p o r t a n c e ,  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  announced 
i n  November 1978 a  s h i f t  from i t s  p a s t  p o l i c y  o f  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  Wes te rn  
arms t r a n s f e r s  t o  t h e  S i n o - S o v i e t  powers .  It i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  
S t a t e s  would no  l o n g e r  oppose  t h e  s a l e  o f  m i l i t a r y  weapons t o  Ch ina  by 
West European c o u n t r i e s .  51  - 
The s t r a t e g i c  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  Sino-American t i e s  was u n d e r l i n e d  by 
Defense  S e c r e t a r y  Haro ld  Brown d u r i n g  a  v i s i t  t o  Ch ina  i n  J a n u a r y  1980-- 
one month a f t e r  t h e  S o v i e t  Union invaded A f g h a n i s t a n .  H e a d l i n e s  r e p o r t i n g  
on t h a t  v i s i t  and s u b s e q u e n t  h i g h - l e v e l  i n t e r c h a n g e  be tween  m i l i t a r y  
l e a d e r s  of China and t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  spoke b o l d l y  o f  an  emerg ing  S ino-  
American " a l l i a n c e "  focused  a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR. I n d e e d ,  t h e  r a p i d  d e c l i n e  
i n  Sov ie t -Amer ican  r e l a t i o n s  a t  t h e  end of 1979 and t h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  s t r o n g  
p e r c e p t i o n  i n  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  o f  a  growing S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t  seemed 
t o  g i v e  impe tus  t o  American i n t e r e s t  i n  c l o s e r  t i e s  w i t h  Ch ina ,  i n c l u d i n g  
s e c u r i t y  t i e s .  C h i n e s e  l e a d e r s ,  f o r  t h e i r  p a r t ,  s t r e s s e d  r e p e a t e d l y  t h e i r  
5 1  For  more i n f o r m a t  i o n ,  s e e  U.S. L i b r a r y  of Congress .  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  
~ e s e a r c h  S e r v i c e .  Uni t ed  S t a t e s - C h i n e s e - S o v i e t  R e l a t  i o n s .  I s s u e  B r i e f  
No. IB79115, by Rober t  G .  S u t t e r  ( p e r i o d i c a l l y  u p d a t e d ) .  Wash ing ton ,  1980.  
20p. 
desire to develop a "longterm, strategic" relationship with the united 
States, adding on occasion their strong interest in obtaining weapons 
and other military equipment from the United States. 
Following Secretary Brown's visit to China, the United States 
announced that it was willing to consider sales to China of selected 
military items and technologies with military support applications. 
In March 1980, the Administration listed categories of military 
support equipment the United States would consider, on a case-by-case 
basis, for export to China  unitio ions Control Newsletter No. 81). 
Included on the list were radar, communications and training equipment, 
trucks, transportation aircraft and unarmed helicopters. The State 
Department announced that it would consider each export license 
application individually, bearing in mind the level of technology 
involved and the items ' intended use. 
Secretary Brown announced in mid-1980 that the U.S. Government 
had approved requests from several American firms to make sales pre- 
sentations to the Chinese for certain articles of military support 
equipment and dual-use technology (items primarily of civilian use but 
with possible military applications). By late 1980 it was reported 
that several hundred such requests had been approved. Carter admini- 
stration spokesmen defined the limits of such U.S. military cooperation 
with China in noting that "the United States and China seek neither 
a military alliance nor any joint defense planning" and that "the 
United States does not sell weapons to China." But they repeatedly 
implied that this policy could be subject to further change, especially 
if either or both countries faced "frontal assaults" on their common 
interests, presumably from the USSR or its proxies. 6 /  - 
Although subject to differing interpretations, the Carter admini- 
stration spokesmen's statements on the limits of the U.S.-China security 
relationship represented a departure from the past practice of the 
Administration and its two Republican predecessors: avoiding public 
explanations of the extent of Sino-American security relations or their 
possible implications, and leaving the policy ambiguous. This approach 
was thought by some analysts to be a useful way to increase the impact 
of the developing Sino-American ties on the Soviet Union; it presumably 
would prompt the USSR to be more forthcoming and accommodating in its 
relations with the United States, in order to discourage Washington from 
developing even closer security ties with China. - 7 /  The ambiguity and 
uncertainty surrounding this aspect of American policy toward China was 
increased with the election of a new U.S. administration in November 1980 
which has yet to articulate a position on the sensitive issue of military 
transfers to China. 
6 /  For additional information, see U.S. Department of State. - 
GIST. U.S.-China Security Relationship. Washington, July 1980. 
7 1  Others, however, saw the ambiguity surrounding U.S.-China rela- 
tionsas designed to hide the absence of a well coordinated U.S. policy 
toward China that could be explained clearly and could receive the full 
support of the American people and their representatives in Congress. 
111. PARAMETERS OF THE DEBATE 
The r e c e n t  deba t e  between proponents  and opponents  of  i n c r e a s e d  
U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China r anges  a c r o s s  a  broad spec t rum o f  f o r e i g n  
p o l i c y  i s s u e s ,  bu t  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  and i n t e r v i e w s  w i th  U.S. 
s p e c i a l i s t s  r e v e a l s  a  number of  common themes and p o i n t s  o f  agreement .  
The consensus on t h e s e  i s s u e s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  narrows t h e  scope of t h e  
d e b a t e ,  and i n  e f f e c t ,  p rov ides  a  framework f o r  it.  81 
This  s e c t i o n  n o t e s  t h e  major p o i n t s  o f  agreement t h a t  have emerged 
i n  t h e  deba t e .  The p o i n t s  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  s u b s e c t i o n s  d e a l i n g  w i th  China,  
t h e  Sov ie t  Union and t h e  United S t a t e s .  It t h e n  shows how consensus  on 
t h e s e  i s s u e s  s e r v e s  t o  narrow t h e  scope of  t h e  d e b a t e ,  and r educes  t h e  
number and complexi ty of t h e  pros  and cons r e g a r d i n g  i n c r e a s e d  U.S. m i l i t a r y  
t r a n s f e r s  t o  China t h a t  must be cons ide red  by U.S. p o l i c y  makers and o t h e r  
i n t e r e s t e d  o b s e r v e r s .  
A.  P o i n t s  of Agreement i n  t h e  Debate 
1.  Chinese C a p a b i l i t i e s  and I n t e n t i o n s  
There i s  g e n e r a l  agreement among U.S. s p e c i a l i s t s  t h a t  China does  
no t  f ace  an immediate c r i s i s  i n  i t s  c u r r e n t  m i l i t a r y  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i th  
81 Thus, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  p u b l i c  warnings a g a i n s t  U.S. m i l i t a r y  
s a l e s  t o  China have sometimes been p a r t i c u l a r l y  s h r i l l  and u n r e a l i s t i c ,  
wi th  some commentaries warning of t h e  d i r e  consequences of  a  major  Ameri- 
can  e f f o r t  t o  "rearm" China.  As s een  below, even advoca t e s  o f  c l o s e r  U.S. 
m i l i t a r y  t i e s  wi th  China s e e  c u r r e n t l y  insurmountab le  impediments t o  such 
an e f f o r t  on bo th  t h e  U.S. and Chinese s i d e s ,  t h e r e b y  e f f e c t i v e l y  e l imina-  
t i n g  t h a t  a s  a  r e a l i s t i c  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  d e b a t e .  
t h e  USSR. As seen  i n  t h e  appendix ,  t h e  Chinese seem capab l e  of  r e s i s t i n g - -  
a l b e i t  a t  g r e a t  cost--a  major  Sov ie t  conven t iona l  a t t a c k .  And a  S o v i e t  
n u c l e a r  a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  China i s  made l e s s  a t t r a c t i v e  because of  t h e  danger  
of a  Chinese n u c l e a r  c o u n t e r s t r i k e  a g a i n s t  Sov ie t  As i a .  China i s  seen a s  
c l e a r l y  t h e  weaker p a r t y  m i l i t a r i l y  a long  t h e  Sino-Soviet  b o r d e r ,  and i t s  
m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  d e c l i n e  r e l a t i v e  t o  t hose  of t h e  USSR 
i f  c u r r e n t  t r e n d s  con t inue .  
While t h e r e  i s  some d isagreement  on whether o r  no t  China ha s  f i r m l y  
dec ided  on what k i n d s  of  weapons o r  o t h e r  m i l i t a r y  equipment i t  would l i k e  
t o  o b t a i n  from the  United S t a t e s ,  9/ i t  seems c l e a r  t h a t  c u r r e n t  Chinese 
i n t e r e s t  i s  q u i t e  s e l e c t i v e .  China ha s  focused on o b t a i n i n g  t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  
t o  produce such s o p h i s t i c a t e d  equipment a s  f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t  engines  and 
r a d a r s ,  a i r - t o - a i r  m i s s i l e s ,  and a n t i - t a n k  m i s s i l e s .  101 Th i s  accords  w i th  -
91 I n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  s e v e r a l  m i l i t a r y  s p e c i a l i s t s  have poin ted  t o  t h e  
seeming i n c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  Pek ing ' s  de f ense  procurement p r o c e s s ,  n o t i n g  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  on-again,  o f f - aga in  Chinese i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  B r i t i s h  
"Har r i e r "  a i r c r a f t .  China a l s o  was r e p o r t e d  ve ry  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  French 
a n t i - t a n k  m i s s i l e s ,  but  agreements  on t h i s  i t em have n o t  been reached .  
The r ea sons  g iven  f o r  t h i s  seeming Chinese i n c o n s i s t e n c y  va ry :  Some 
p o i n t  t o  C h i n a ' s  r e c e n t l y  he ightened  awareness  of i t s  i n a b i l i t y  t o  pay 
f o r  f o r e i g n  equipment.  Others  n o t e  t h e  r e l u c t a n c e  of  some wes te rn  c o u n t r i e s  
t o  of fend  t he  USSR by be ing  one of t h e  f i r s t  Western powers t o  s e l l  weapons 
t o  China.  S t i l l  o t h e r s  emphasize t h a t  Western c o u n t r i e s  a r e  unwi l l i ng  t o  
supply  China wi th  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  m i l i t a r y  equipment t h a t  they  judge would 
be o f  l i t t l e  p r a c t i c a l  use f o r  China g iven  t h e  c u r r e n t ,  r e l a t i v e l y  low 
t e c h n i c a l  competence i n  t he  PRC. 
101 Chinese l e a d e r s  a r e  seen  a s  p r e s s i n g  t he  United S t a t e s  t o  -
permit  such m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s ,  bo th  t o  enhance Ch ina ' s  m i l i t a r y  
power a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR and t o  demons t ra te  America 's  growing commitment 
t o  Ch ina ' s  de f ense .  Thus, f o r  example, Su Yu, a  s e n i o r  Chinese m i l i t a r y  
l e a d e r ,  t o l d  t he  Japanese  p r e s s  i n  March 1980 t h a t  Amer ica ' s  w i l l i n g n e s s  
t o  move ahead wi th  s a l e s  of  m i l i t a r y  equipment t o  China was seen by t h e  
Chinese a s  a  key i n d i c a t i o n  of t h e  U.S commitment t o  work w i th  China i n  
a  common f r o n t  a g a i n s t  t h e  Sov ie t  Union. Vice Premier Geng Biao and Vice 
Fore ign  M i n i s t e r  Zhang Wenjin both subsequen t ly  t o l d  t he  Western news media 
t h a t  they  a n t i c i p a t e  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  w i l l  s e l l  arms t o  China i n  t h e  
f u t u r e .  Recent ev idence  of t h i s  view was seen  i n  t he  Washington P o s t ,  
November 23 ,  1980. 
t h e  views of many Western a n a l y s t s  who s t r e s s  C h i n a ' s  need f o r  a l l - w e a t h e r  
f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t ,  g r e a t e r  d e f e n s i v e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a g a i n s t  S o v i e t  armor,  and 
g r e a t e r  a b i l i t y  t o  provide  a i r  cover  i n  nearby w a t e r s .  
There i s  g e n e r a l  agreement among U . S .  s p e c i a l i s t s  t h a t  PRC m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e s  a r e  des igned  and deployed f o r  t h e  de fense  of China and a r e  n o t  w e l l  
s u i t e d  o r  p o s i t i o n e d  t o  p r o j e c t  power f a r  from Ch ina ' s  b o r d e r s .  This  does  
n o t  mean t h a t  a n a l y s t s  a g r e e  t h a t  China would no t  use  i t s  e x i s t i n g  f o r c e s  
t o  a t t a c k  nearby  a r e a s .  Indeed ,  some a n a l y s t s  judge t h a t  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  a  
new Chinese a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  Vietnam remain h i g h ,  and o t h e r  a n a l y s t s  remain 
q u i t e  s k e p t i c a l  of PRC c l a ims  of "peace fu l "  i n t e n t i o n s  toward Taiwan. 
There a r e  a l s o  s e r i o u s  l i m i t s  seen  i n  P e k i n g ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  pay f o r  and 
u t i l i z e  l a r g e  amounts of s o p h i s t i c a t e d  weapons and weapons-related t e ch -  
nology.  C h i n a ' s  c u r r e n t  economic program a c t u a l l y  c a l l s  f o r  a  c u t  i n  t h e  
de fense  budget ,  and i t  promises t o  g ive  de fense  mode rn i za t i on  t h e  lowest  
p r i o r i t y  among t h e  fou r  modern iza t ions  pursued by t h e  p r e s e n t  l e a d e r s h i p .  - 111 
Ch ina ' s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  u s ing  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  a i r c r a f t  eng ine  
technology  of t h e  Sov ie t  MiG-21 and t h e  Ro l l s  Royce "Spey" eng ine  a r e  
seen a s  symptomatic of a  b roader  PRC t e c h n i c a l  weakness which was s e v e r e l y  
exace rba t ed  by t h e  d i s r u p t i o n  of Chinese h i g h e r  educa t i on  and r e s e a r c h  
d u r i n g  1966-1976. 
111 While t h e r e  was some p u b l i c  deba t e  i n  China d u r i n g  1977 and 1978 
o v e r h o w  much of Ch ina ' s  r e s o u r c e s  would be devoted t o  modernizing t h e  
de fense  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  t h e  t r e n d  s i n c e  then  has  been t o  g i v e  de fense  
modern iza t ion  a  low p r i o r i t y .  See t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  of  t h i s  i s s u e  i n  t h e  
Appendix, p. 51.  
2 .  S o v i e t  O b j e c t i v e s  
A n a l y s t s  seem t o  a g r e e  g e n e r a l l y  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t  Union w i l l  r emain  
i n s e c u r e  a b o u t  i t s  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  F a r  E a s t  f  
i f  China  s h o u l d  a l t e r  i t s  c u r r e n t  f o r e i g n  p o l  
even-handed p o s t u r e  be tween  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  
a r e  viewed a s  l i k e l y  t o  r emain  d i s t r u s t f u l  o f  
o r  some t i m e  t o  come. Even 
i c y  and move toward a  more 
and USSR, S o v i e t  p l a n n e r s  
China and i n t e n t  o n  main- 
t a i n i n g  S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  power i n  t h e  r e g i o n  t o  p r o t e c t  a g a i n s t  p o s s i b l e  
C h i n e s e  i n c u r s i o n s .  M i l i t a r y  power i s  one  o f  t h e  few r e l i a b l e  s o u r c e s  
o f  i n f l u e n c e  Moscow c a n  b r i n g  t o  b e a r  t o  p r o t e c t  i t s  i n t e r e s t s  a g a i n s t  
a  China t h a t  i s  growing i n  economic and m i l i t a r y  power and c o n s o l i d a t i n g  
r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  two m a j o r  powers i n  t h e  r e g i o n ,  J a p a n  and t h e  
Uni ted  S t a t e s .  One o f  t h e  ma jo r  S o v i e t  o b j e c t i v e s  - 121 i n  t h e  r e g i o n  
a p p a r e n t l y  i s  t h e  p r o t e c t i o n  and development  o f  e a s t e r n  S i b e r i a ,  which 
USSR p l a n n e r s  r e p o r t e d l y  v i e w  a s  an  i m p o r t a n t  e l e m e n t  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  
economic deve lopment  o f  t h e  USSR. A s u b s t a n t i a l  S i n o - S o v i e t  r e c o n c i l -  
i a t i o n  t h a t  would a l l o w  t h e  USSR t o  lower  i t s  g u a r d  a g a i n s t  China i s  
s e e n  a s  o n l y  a  v e r y  remote  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e .  
Moscow's o b v i o u s  d e s i r e  t o  s l o w  o r  h a l t  t h e  development  o f  S ino-  
American m i l i t a r y  t i e s  i s  commonly p e r c e i v e d  a s  m o t i v a t e d  by c o n c e r n  
121 As n o t e d  i n  S e c t i o n  IV below,  t h e r e  i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e b a t e  
a m o n g a n a l y s t  s a b o u t  S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  i n t e n t i o n s  a b r o a d ,  i n c l u d i n g  i n  
A s i a .  Some a n a l y s t s  s e e  t h e  USSR a s  b a s i c a l l y  r e a c t i v e  and d e f e n s i v e ,  
whereas  o t h e r s  s e e  i t  a s  e x p a n s i o n i s t i c ,  and a s  s e e k i n g  m i l i t a r y  su-  
p e r i o r i t y  and dominance.  The p o i n t  h e r e  i s  m e r e l y  t o  show t h a t  t h e  
a n a l y s t s  g e n e r a l l y  a g r e e  t h a t ,  wha tever  t h e  m o t i v e s  o f  t h e  USSR, i t  
w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  s e e  a  need f o r  s t r o n g  m i l i t a r y  power a g a i n s t  China 
i n  A s i a  f o r  some t i m e  t o  come. 
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ove r  growing Chinese power and worry about  a  p o s s i b l y  emerging U.S.- 
backed g l o b a l  system, i n c l u d i n g  China a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  NATO c o u n t r i e s  
and J apan ,  which would be d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR. I t  i s  t h u s  
r e p e a t e d l y  emphasized t h a t  Moscow w i l l  l i k e l y  view U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  
t i e s  n o t  s o l e l y  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of t h e i r  impact on t h e  Sino-Soviet  m i l i t a r y  
ba l ance  i n  As i a ,  bu t  i t  w i l l  weigh t h e i r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  t h e  b roade r  
c o n t e x t  o f  o v e r a l l  American p o l i c y  toward t h e  Sov ie t  Union. 
3 .  U.S. I n t e r e s t s  and O b j e c t i v e s  
While t h e  United S t a t e s  i s  seen  a s  f avo r ing  a  s e c u r e  and independent  
China ,  a  r a d i c a l  change i n  C h i n a ' s  c u r r e n t  d e f e n s e  p o l i c y  toward a l a r g e  
s c a l e  m i l i t a r y  b u i l d  up of Chinese f o r c e s  i s  wide ly  viewed a s  c o n t r a r y  
t o  U.S. i n t e r e s t s .  Such a  move would upse t  t h e  Chinese economic moderni- 
z a t i o n  program and perhaps would l e a d  t o  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  China .  
It would upse t  t h e  r e g i o n a l  ba l ance  of  power i n  Eas t  As ia  i n  ways probably  
adve r se  t o  American i n t e r e s t s .  
Most U.S. s p e c i a l i s t s  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  would n o t  l i k e l y  
o f f e r  f r e e  m i l i t a r y  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  China under  f o r e s e e a b l e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  
They accep t  t h e  view t h a t  c u r r e n t  Chinese economic and t e c h n i c a l  weaknesses  
p r ec lude  l a r g e  s c a l e  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t h a t  would fundamenta l ly  a f f e c t  
Ch ina ' s  power p r o j e c t i o n  c a p a b i l i t i e s - o v e r  t h e  n e a r  term.  131 - As a  r e s u l t  
13/  Ph ra se s  l i k e  "near  term" and " f o r e s e e a b l e  c i r cums tances"  a r e  
terms t h a t  o f f e r  on ly  a  l i m i t e d  deg ree  o f  p r e c i s i o n .  The i n t e n -  
t i o n  h e r e  i s  t o  no t e  t h a t  b a r r i n g  some major  change i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
o r d e r ,  China,  a s  a  r e s u l t  of U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s ,  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  pose 
a  much more s e r i o u s  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t  t han  i t  does  now, a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  t h e  
l a t t e r  p a r t  of t h e  decade.  
a t t e n t i o n  has  focused on t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and symbolic r e p e r c u s s i o n s  
of  U.S-China m i l i t a r y  t i e s .  O s t e n t a t i o u s  d i s p l a y s  of U.S. m i l i t a r y  
c o o p e r a t i o n  wi th  China--if no t  backed by substance--are  s a i d  t o  r i s k  
m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a t  home and abroad and should be avoided i n  f avo r  
o r  more q u i e t  i n t e r change .  Under i d e a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  i t  would be d e s i r a b l e  
t o  a l l ow  Sino-U.S. r e l a t i o n s  t o  mature f o r  a  few more y e a r s  b e f o r e  
moving i n t o  t h e  symbo l i ca l l y  impor tan t  a r e a  of  m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s .  
A common recommendation i n  t h i s  r ega rd  i s  f o r  more c l e a r  a r t i c u l a t i o n  
and management of U.S. p o l i c y  toward China. - 14/  Seve ra l  China s p e c i a l i s t s  
have n o t e d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  Chinese l e a d e r s  seem t o  i n t e r p r e t  p a s t  
American behav io r  a s  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t he  United S t a t e s  would soon be 
w i l l i n g  t o  t r a n s f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  m i l i t a r y  equipment t o  China,  i n c l u d i n g  
arms. They have added t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  should avoid g i v i n g  such 
impress ions  u n l e s s  i t  has  t h e  intent ion--and t h e  p o l i t i c a l  suppo r t  a t  
home--to fo l l ow  through wi th  t h e  m i l i t a r y  s a l e s .  It i s  i m p e r a t i v e ,  
i n  t h e i r  view,  t h a t  t he  United S t a t e s  be a b l e  a t  some po in t  "draw 
t h e  l i n e "  w i th  t h e  Chinese ,  and t he reby  r e f u s e  growing Chinese p r e s s u r e  
f o r  m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  wi thout  g i v i n g  t h e  Chinese t h e  impress ion  of  
a  s u b s t a n t i a l  d e c l i n e  i n  U.S. i n t e r e s t  i n  c l o s e  t i e s  wi th  t h e  PRC. 
It i s  a l s o  widely he ld  t h a t  i nc r ea sed  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n f e r s  t o  China 
would probably  t o  some e x t e n t  reduce U.S. i n f l u e n c e  and enhance Chinese 
i n f l u e n c e  e l  sewhere i n  As i a .  They would prompt u n c e r t a i n t y  among long- 
s t a n d i n g  U.S. f r i e n d s  and a l l i e s  i n  As i a ,  w i th  t h e  p o s s i b l e  excep t ions  
14 /  Indeed ,  s e v e r a l  a n a l y s t s  claimed t h a t  t h e  U.S. l e a d e r s  have n o t  
even d e f i n e d  what r o l e  t he  U.S. would l i k e  t o  s e e  China p l ay  i n  f u t u r e  glo-  
b a l  and r e g i o n a l  development ,  and t h e r e f o r e  f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  de te rmine  
how U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  would h e l p  o r  h i n d e r  China p l ay ing  t h a t  r o l e .  
of P a k i s t a n  and Tha i l and ,  which might  welcome such t i e s .  They would deepen 
t h e  s u s p i c i o n s  of I n d i a ,  Taiwan, and Vietnam toward t h e  United S t a t e s  
and would s e r i o u s l y  reduce  t h e  p rospec t  o f  a more c o o p e r a t i v e  U.S.-Soviet 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  ( I n  l i g h t  o f  r e c e n t  U.S.-Soviet d i f f e r e n c e s  ove r  b i l a t e r a l  
i s s u e s ,  arms c o n t r o l ,  Poland and compe t i t i on  i n  t h e  Th i rd  World, such a  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  g e n e r a l l y  thought  t o  be a  remote p rospec t  a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  t i m e . )  
B.  I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  Cur r en t  P o l i c y  
These commonly h e l d  views sugges t  a  narrower range  of  d i s p u t e  i n  
t h e  d e b a t e  t han  appea r s  a t  f i r s t  g l ance  and may make i t  e a s i e r  f o r  p o l i c y  
makers and o t h e r  o b s e r v e r s  t o  a s s e s s  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  t h e  p ros  and cons of  
U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  t i e s .  For one t h i n g ,  t h e y  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  need no t  rush  m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China i n  o r d e r  t o  h e l p  China 
a g a i n s t  m i l i t a r y  t h r e a t  from t h e  USSR. And, t h e  United S t a t e s  need n o t  
worry e x c e s s i v e l y  about  a  p o s s i b l e  breakthrough i n  Sino-Soviet  r e l a t i o n s  
t h a t  would s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reduce  Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y  p r eoccupa t ion  w i th  China 
i n  As ia .  
Also ,  China i s  l i k e l y  t o  be q u i t e  s e l e c t i v e  i n  what i t  a g r e e s  t o  
buy from t h e  United S t a t e s ;  and whatever  t h e  United S t a t e s  p r o v i d e s ,  
i t  w i l l  p robably  t a k e  many y e a r s  b e f o r e  i t  markedly i n c r e a s e s  Ch ina ' s  
power a g a i n s t  i t s  main adve r sa ry  o r  i n c r e a s e s  C h i n a ' s  a b i l i t y  t o  p r o j e c t  
power f a r  beyond i t s  b o r d e r s .  
The c u r r e n t l y  main importance o f  U.S. t r a n s f e r s  t o  China i s  a p o l i t i c a l  
o r  symbolic one.  The t r a n s f e r s  w i l l  c l e a r l y  have an upse t t ing- - though n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  adve r se - - e f f ec t  on U.S. r e l a t i o n s  w i th  o t h e r  Asian s t a t e s  
and t h e  Sov ie t  Union. Moscow w i l l  v iew such t r a n s f e r s  n o t  on ly  i n  t h e  
context of its competition with China but also with an eye toward broad 
U.S. intentions toward the USSR. Managing such a symbolically important 
and consequential relationship with China is widely seen as requiring a 
more clearly defined perception of American interests in China that will 
avoid serious misinterpretation of American intentions at home and abroad. 
I V .  DIFFERING STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS AND CONTENDING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
Before  rev iewing ,  i n  S e c t i o n  V ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  p r o s  and cons o f  
i n c r e a s e d  U.S. m i l t i a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China,  t h i s  s e c t i o n  e x p l a i n s  why 
s p e c i a l i s t s  have adopted d i f f e r e n t  o p i n i o n s  and s i d e d  w i th  d i f f e r e n t  s choo l s  
of  thought  on t h i s  q u e s t i o n .  It shows t h a t  t h e i r  c o n f l i c t i n g  v iews  have 
depended h e a v i l y  on t h e i r  d i v e r g i n g  assessments  of an u n d e r l i n i n g  b roade r  
s t r a t e g i c  q u e s t i o n  i n  U.S. f o r e i g n  policy--how f a r  should  t h e  United S t a t e s  
go i n  t r y i n g  t o  improve r e l a t i o n s  w i th  China i n  o r d e r  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  t h e  
American i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o s i t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  Sov ie t  Union? I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
a n a l y s t s  who a r e  deep ly  concerned w i th  U.S. m i l i t a r y  weakness v i s - a -v i s  
t h e  Sov ie t  Union and who view China a s  s t r o n g l y  opposed t o  t h e  USSR and 
f a v o r a b l e  t o  t he  U.S. t end  t o  suppor t  i n c r e a s e d  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  
t o  China. I n  c o n t r a s t ,  a n a l y s t s  who a r e  sanguine  about U .  S. power v i s - a -v i s  
t h e  Sov ie t  Union o r  who a r e  s k e p t i c a l  of Ch ina ' s  r e l i a b i l i t y  o r  s t r e n g t h  
tend  t o  oppose such s a l e s .  
The s e c t i o n  f i r s t  examines t h e  major  d i f f e r i n g  views on Amer ica ' s  
p o s i t i o n  i n  i t s  r i v a l r y  w i th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union and on C h i n a ' s  p o s s i b l e  r o l e  
i n  suppor t  of t h e  United S t a t e s .  It then  shows how t h e s e  d i f f e r i n g  views-- 
a s  we l l  a s  some o t h e r  more s p e c i a l i z e d  concerns  i n  U.S. f o r e i g n  pol icy--  
have l ed  a n a l y s t s  t o  a l i g n  w i th  one o r  ano the r  of t h e  contending  s c h o o l s  
of thought  t h a t  have begun t o  emerge on t h e  q u e s t i o n  of U.S. m i l i t a r y  s a l e s  
t o  China. 
A. D i f f e r i n g  S t r a t e g i c  Assumptions 
1.  Sov ie t  Expansion and I t s  Chal lenge  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  
There i s  a  l a r g e  body of  op in ion  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  t h a t  s e e s  t h e  
Sov ie t  Union a s  an e x p a n s i o n i s t  power t h a t  seeks  m i l i t a r y ,  economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  preeminence i n  t h e  world.  (Some s p e c i a l i s t s  add t h a t  t h e  USSR 
i s  a l s o  anxious  t o  p r o j e c t  world r e v o l u t i o n  abroad i n  o r d e r  t o  g a i n  world 
i d e o l o g i c a l  p reeminence . )  The S o v i e t s  a r e  viewed a s  seek ing  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
o v e r a l l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s u p e r i o r i t y  over  t h e  United S t a t e s  and a r e  seen  a s  
on t h e  ascendency i n  t h i s  e f f o r t .  Curren t  t r e n d s  a r e  viewed on ba l ance  a s  
f avo r ing  Sov ie t  amb i t i ons ,  a s  p r e sen t  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  and e lements  of  i n s t a b i l i t y  
i n  t h e  world a r e  be l i eved  t o  o f f e r  t h e  USSR f e r t i l e  grounds f o r  e x p l o i t a t i o n .  
Although Sov ie t  i n t e r e s t s  have s u f f e r e d  c e r t a i n  s e t b a c k s ,  Sov ie t  l e a d e r s  
have n o t  been d i v e r t e d  from t h e i r  u l t i m a t e  o b j e c t i v e s  by momentary s e t b a c k s ;  
they  t a k e  a  p a t i e n t ,  long term view of h i s t o r y ,  t h e i r  con f idence  b o l s t e r e d  
by a  s ense  o f  d e s t i n y .  
Another group emphasizes t h a t  even though Sov ie t  l e a d e r s  may s t r i v e  
f o r  s u p e r i o r i t y  and preeminence, c i r cums tances  un favo rab l e  t o  t h e  USSR 
have profoundly  a f f e c t e d  t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n s .  Spokesmen of  t h i s  group s e e  
t h e  ba l ance  of world developments a s  f r e q u e n t l y  coun te r  t o  Sov ie t  d e s i g n s .  
Domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  a r e  perce ived  a s  l i m i t i n g  Sov ie t  freedom 
t o  pursue  t h e i r  o b j e c t i v e s .  Sov ie t  l e a d e r s  a r e  s a i d  t o  be aware of  t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  i d e o l o g i c a l  g o a l s  a r e  p r e s e n t l y  u n a t t a i n a b l e  and they  
a r e  f i n d i n g  i t  neces sa ry  t o  a d j u s t  t h e i r  p o l i c i e s  t o  c u r r e n t  r e a l i t i e s .  
While t he  Sov ie t  Union might s t r i v e  t o  ach ieve  s u p e r i o r i t y  over  t h e  United 
S t a t e s ,  i t  i s  seen a s  having g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  do ing  so .  I n  s h o r t ,  t h e  
Sov ie t  Union today q u a l i f i e s  on ly  m i l i t a r i l y  a s  a  superpower. 
A t h i r d  group b e l i e v e s  t h a t  t h e  Sov ie t  Union i s  f a r  l e s s  e x p a n s i o n i s t i c  
t h a n  i n  t h e  p a s t  and t h a t  Sov ie t  p o l i c i e s  a r e  be ing  shaped p r i m a r i l y  by t h e  
c o u n t r y ' s  r equ i r emen t s  of  i n t e r n a l  s o c i a l  and economic development and 
a  h i s t o r i c  s ense  of i n s e c u r i t y .  A more c o n f i d e n t  and s e c u r e  S o v i e t  l e a d e r -  
s h i p ,  a cco rd ing  t o  t h i s  view,  would be r eady  t o  a c t  a s  a  r e s p o n s i b l e  p a r t i c -  
i p a n t  i n  an i n c r e a s i n g l y  i n t e rdependen t  world.  Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t s  
a r e  s een  by t h i s  group a s  an unwanted d r a i n  on r e s o u r c e s  based on t h e  S o v i e t  
view (pe rhaps  misguided)  of what i s  needed t o  m a i n t a i n  s e c u r i t y .  S ince  S o v i e t  
l e a d e r s  unders tand  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  b e s t  se rved  by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a b i l i t y ,  
t h e i r  fundamental i n t e r e s t s  a r e  r e c o n c i l a b l e  w i th  t h o s e  of  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
Ana lys t s  who t a k e  t h i s  more benign  v iew o f  Sov ie t  p o l i c i e s  and g o a l s  
c a u t i o n  a g a i n s t  looking  a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  developments  i n  te rms  of  superpower 
winners  and l o s e r s .  They judge t h a t  i t  i s  s h o r t s i g h t e d  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  t o  
& equa t e  Sov ie t  s e tbacks  w i th  Western g a i n s  and v i ce -ve r sa .  They s t r e s s  t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  shared  i n t e r e s t s ,  dange r s  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  between t h e  super -  
powers i n  a  number of  a r e a s .  They advoca te  American p o l i c y  aimed a t  i n c r e a s i n g  
t h e  Sov ie t  s t a k e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a b i l i t y  and p rov id ing  t h e  Sov ie t  Union 
wi th  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  cont inued  coope ra t i on  w i t h  t h e  West. 
2 .  U.S. A b i l i t y  t o  Deal With S o v i e t  Power 
C lose ly  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  d i f f e r i n g  views of  Sov ie t  power and i n t e n t i o n s  
a r e  d i v e r g i n g  assessments  of  U.S. a b i l i t y  t o  d e a l  w i th  t h a t  power. On one 
s i d e  a r e  t hose  who s e e  American a b i l i t i e s  a s  somewhat l e s s  t h a n  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  
when t h e  United S t a t e s  enjoyed dominant m i l i t a r y ,  economic and p o l i t i c a l  
i n f l u e n c e  i n  world a f f a i r s ,  bu t  n o n e t h e l e s s  s t i l l  q u i t e  adequate  t o  handle  
emerging Sov ie t  power. 
O the r s  s t r e s s  t h a t  U.S. power--especial ly  m i l i t a r y  power--has 
d e c l i n e d  s t e a d i l y  t o  a  p o i n t  where t h e  USSR now en joys  b a s i c  s u p e r i o r i t y  
over  t he  United S t a t e s  i n  bo th  conven t iona l  and s t r a t e g i c  weapons. They 
a r e  g e n e r a l l y  o p t i m i s t i c ,  however, t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  ha s  begun t o  
r e d r e s s  t h e  m i l i t a r y  ba l ance  and w i l l  be a b l e  t o  c a t c h  up w i th  t h e  Sov ie t  
Union and c l o s e  t h e  so -ca l l ed  "window of  v u l n e r a b i l i t y "  by t h e  end of  
t h e  decade .  151 -
S t i l l  o t h e r s  a r e  more p e s s i m i s t i c  about U.S. m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s ,  
which t hey  s e e  a s  l i k e l y  t o  d e c l i n e  f u r t h e r  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  Sov ie t  Union, 
s h o r t  of a  major  shock i n  American f o r e i g n  p o l i c y .  It i s  sometimes 
no ted  t h a t  even though U.S. m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s  may d e c l i n e ,  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  s t i l l  @s many more capab l e  a l l i e s  than  does  t h e  USSR; U.S. a l l i e s  
presumably can  a s s i s t  i n  checking Sov ie t  expans ion .  However, s e v e r a l  m i l i t a r y  
p l anne r s  have s t r e s s e d  t h a t  t he  a l l i e s  have been slow and h a l t i n g  i n  t h e i r  
e f f o r t s  t o  r e d r e s s  what i s  seen a s  an emerging East-West d i s e q u i l i b r i u m .  
They p e r c e i v e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a  weakened a l l i e d  p o s t u r e  i n  Nor theas t  As i a .  
They judge t h a t  t h e  ba l ance  t h e r e  ha s  become more d i sadvantageous  a s  U.S. 
151 They sometimes add t h a t  p r o j e c t e d  Sov ie t  economic and o t h e r  i n t e r n a l  
d i f f c u l t i e s  by t h e  end of t h e  decade w i l l  r e s t r i c t  Moscow's a b i l i t y  t o  
expand i t s  m i l i t a r y  power a s  i n  t h e  pa s t  and w i l l  t h e r eby  enhance Amer ica ' s  
a b i l i t y  t o  c l o s e  t h e  power gap.  
T e c h n i c a l l y  speak ing ,  t h e  term "window of  v u l n e r a b i l i t y "  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  
pe r iod  when U.S. land-based ICBM's w i l l  be  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  Sov ie t  a t tack- -a  
per iod  t h a t  i s  supposed t o  end wi th  t h e  deployment of t h e  new MX m i s s i l e .  
However, t h e  term i s  sometimes used more b road ly  t o  r e f e r  t o  what i s  seen  
as  a  g e n e r a l  superpower imbalance,  a g a i n s t  t h e  United S t a t e s .  
f o r c e s  have been drawn down a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  end o f  t h e  Vietnam War 
and t h e  d i v e r s i o n  of f o r c e s  t o  t h e  P e r s i a n  Gulf and I n d i a n  Ocean, and 
a s  t h e  Sov ie t  Union h a s  con t inued  t o  b u i l d  s t e a d i l y  i t s  a i r ,  n a v a l  and 
ground f o r c e s  i n  t h e  a r e a .  They add t h a t  Japan--the l a r g e s t  and most 
c apab l e  U.S. a l l y  i n  Asia--has he lped  i nadequa t e ly  t o  r e d r e s s  t h e  ba l ance  
ove r  t h e  p a s t  s e v e r a l  y e a r s .  l&/ 
3 .  China ' s  U t i l i t y  i n  U.S. Compet i t ion  With t h e  USSR 
China p l ays  an impor tan t  and h e l p f u l  r o l e  i n  U.S. g l o b a l  and r e g i o n a l  
s t r a t e g i c  p l ann ing ,  e s p e c i a l l y  v i s -a -v is  t h e  USSR, acco rd ing  t o  many 
a n a l y s t s .  Most a g r e e  t h a t  China c u r r e n t l y  a s s i s t s  t h e  United S t a t e s  by 
t y i n g  down Sov ie t  t r o o p s  and r e s o u r c e s  t h a t  o t h e r w i s e  might  be focused 
a g a i n s t  t h e  West i n  Europe o r  t h e  Middle E a s t .  This  compl i ca t e s  S o v i e t  
d e f e n s i v e  s t r a t e g y ,  n o t a b l y  by r a i s i n g  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n  t h e  USSR about  t h e  
161 Some a n a l y s t s  o f f e r  s i m i l a r l y  a la rming  views of  t h e  d e c l i n e  
of  t h e a l l i e d  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  f a c e  of  S o v i e t  o r  Soviet-backed expans ionism 
i n  Sou theas t  As i a ,  and they  argue s t r o n g l y  f o r  c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  China 
a s  a  means t o  s u s t a i n  a  f a v o r a b l e  e q u i l i b r i u m .  A s  i n  t h e  c a s e  of  Nor theas t  
As i a ,  t h e s e  a n a l y s t s  s e e  i t  a s  fundamenta l ly  impor t an t  t h a t  t h e  U.S. i n -  
c r e a s e  m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China,  no t  s o  much because  t h e y  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  
Chinese power a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR, b u t  because they  w i l l  c o n s o l i d a t e  U.S. 
r e l a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  PRC and t he reby  i n c r e a s e  p r o s p e c t s  t h a t  China w i l l  s i d e  
w i th  t h e  United S t a t e s  i n  t h e  event  o f  East-West c o n f r o n t a t i o n  i n  Nor theas t  
o r  Sou theas t  As ia .  
I n  c o n t r a s t ,  some o t h e r  m i l i t a r y  p l a n n e r s  a r e  l e s s  concerned by t h e  
changing m i l i t a r y  ba l ance  i n  Eas t  As ia .  They tend  t o  emphasize S o v i e t  l o g i s -  
t i c a l  problems and o t h e r  sou rce s  of m i l i t a r y  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  a s  w e l l  a s  Moscow's 
p o l i t i c a l  i s o l a t i o n .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  Moscow h a s  made few g a i n s  i n  expanding 
i t s  i n f l u e n c e  a s  t h e  United S t a t e s  h a s  p u l l e d  back i t  f o r c e s ,  and t h e  two major  
r e g i o n a l  powers -- China and Japan  -- c o n t i n u e  t o  work a g a i n s t  Sov ie t  i n t e r e s t s  
i n  t he  r e g i o n .  
s e c u r i t y  o f  t h e  Sov ie t  Asian f r o n t  should c o n f l i c t  b reak  ou t  f a r t h e r  
wes t .  171 
But w i t h i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  t h e r e  a r e  wide r ang ing  views of Ch ina ' s  
u t i l i t y  i n  h e l p i n g  t h e  United S t a t e s  i n  i t s  compe t i t i on  w i th  t h e  Sovie t  
Union. Some hold  t h a t  China i s  a  r e l a t i v e l y  weak sou rce  of  l eve rage  
a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR, n o t i n g  t h a t  China i s  s o  much weaker than  t he  USSR 
t h a t  i t  would be u n l i k e l y  t o  cause  s e r i o u s  concern f o r  Moscow i n  t h e  
event  o f  East-West c o n f l i c t  e l sewhere .  18/ -
Others  s e e  China a s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  s t r o n g  m i l i t a r i l y  and r e l i a b l e  
p o l i t i c a l l y  t h a t  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  a  u s e f u l  p a r t n e r  f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s  
i n  e f f o r t s  t o  curb  Sov ie t  expansionism. S t i l l  o t h e r s  s t r e s s  t h a t  
wh i l e  China may be e f f e c t i v e  a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR today ,  t h e  growing 
d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  between Chinese and Sov ie t  f o r c e s  a long  t h e  bo rde r  
over  t h e  l onge r  term could cause  China t o  r e c o n s i d e r  i t s  a n t i - S o v i e t  
p o s t u r e  and r each  an accommodation w i th  Moscow c o n t r a r y  t o  American 
i n t e r e s t s .  
171 Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y  p l anne r s  a r e  thought  t o  a s s e s s  Ch ina ' s  l i m i t e d  
m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t e s  much more r e a l i s t i c a l l y  than  t h e  s h r i l l  Sov i e t  media 
commentaries which warn of  t h e  China " t h r e a t . "  Neve r the l e s s ,  Sov i e t  
l o g i s t i c a l  problems and o t h e r  weakness i n  As ia  a s  we l l  a s  t h e i r  a s s e s s -  
ment of t h e  probable  c o s t  of any p r o t r a c t e d  c o n f l i c t  wi th  China a r e  thought  
t o  promote g e n e r a l  Sov ie t  concern about  t h e  Asian f r o n t .  
18/ A  few i n  t h i s  group hold  t h a t  Ch ina ' s  commitment t o  an an t i -Sov ie t  
f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  i s  l e s s  s t r o n g  t han  i t  a p p e a r s ,  emphasizing t h a t  China would 
l i k e l y  a r r a n g e  a  modus v ivend i  wi th  t h e  USSR r a t h e r  than  r i s k  be ing  drawn 
i n t o  a  U.S:-Soviet c o n f f o n t a t i o n .  They sometimes add t h a t  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  
of such Chinese behavior  may have become somewhat g r e a t e r  i n  r e c e n t  months 
a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  r e p o r t e d  Chinese i r r i t a t i o n  w i th  t h e  Reagan A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  
avowed p o l i c y  of  improved r e l a t i o n s  wi th  Taiwan. 
B. Contending Schools  of Thought 
La rge ly  depending on how t h e y  a s s e s s  t h e  Soviet-American r i v a l r y  
and C h i n a ' s  p o t e n t i a l  r o l e  i n  t h a t  r i v a l r y ,  a n a l y s t s  t end  t o  i d e n t i f y  
wi th  s e v e r a l  d i s c e r n a b l e  groups of o p i n i o n  o r  s choo l s  of  thought  191 t h a t  
have begun t o  emerge i n  t h e  p a s t  few months. Observers  i n  t h e s e  groups 
have n a t u r a l l y  been i n c l i n e d  t o  g i v e  more s t r e s s  t o  some i s s u e s ,  wh i l e  
s o f t p e d a l i n g  o t h e r s .  They have p r e d i c t a b l y  done s o  w i t h  an eye  toward 
s a f egua rd ing  a s p e c t s  of U.S. f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  of  p a r t i c u l a r  impor tance  
t o  them. 
Thus, f o r  example, many U.S. m i l i t a r y  p l a n n e r s  have shown p a r t i c u l a r  
concern  w i th  what t h e y  have seen  a s  t h e  r e l a t i v e  d e c l i n e  of U.S. m i l i t a r y  
power v i s - a -v i s  t h e  Sov ie t  Union i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  D i s s a t i s f i e d  wi th  
a l l i e d  e f f o r t s  t o  h e l p  r e d r e s s  t h e  b a l a n c e ,  many p l a n n e r s  view U.S. 
m i l i t a r y  coope ra t i on  w i th  China a s  a  u s e f u l  sou rce  of l e v e r a g e  t h a t  
could  h e l p  t o  remedy t h a t  d e c l i n e .  201 I n  c o n t r a s t ,  Americans i n t e r e s t e d  
191 These schools  of thought  a r e  by no means c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  g roups ,  
w i t h u n i f o r m  p o i n t s  o f  view. R a t h e r ,  t h e y  r e p r e s e n t  on ly  t h e  beginnings  
of t h e  development of f o c a l  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  growing deba t e  on U.S-China 
m i l i t a r y  t i e s .  
201 This  p o i n t  o f  view was vo iced  by a  number of  U.S. m i l i t a r y  a n a l y s t s  
who were i n t e r v i e w e d ,  a l though t h e y  acknowledged t h a t  p u b l i c  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
t h e i r  approach has  been s p a r s e .  For a  c l a s s i c  example of  t h i s  p o i n t  of v iew,  
s e e  t h e  a r t i c l e s  by Michael P i l l s b u r y  c i t e d  a t  t h e  end o f  t h i s  s t u d y .  
It should be added t h a t  t h e s e  m i l i t a r y  p l a n n e r s  tend  t o  s t r e s s  t h a t  
even though PRC m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s  a r e  n o t  expec ted  t o  i n c r e a s e  r a p i d l y  
as  a  r e s u l t  of i n c r e a s e d  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China ,  c l o s e r  U.S.-China 
s e c u r i t y  t i e s  a r e  b e n e f i c i a l  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s .  They would h e l p  
e n s u r e  t h a t  China would remain on t h e  U.S. s i d e  i n  t h e  even t  of a  major  E a s t -  
West c o n f r o n t a t i o n  and would i n c r e a s e  Sov ie t  worry about  China t a k i n g  
a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR i n  con junc t i on  w i th  U.S. a c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  t h e  Sov ie t  
Union. 
i n  arms c o n t r o l  w i th  t h e  USSR f r e q u e n t l y  a r e  concerned w i th  r e s t o r i n g  
enough t r u s t  i n  U.S.-Soviet r e l a t i o n s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  conc lu s ion  of i m -  
p o r t a n t  agreements  on SALT, MBFR and n u c l e a r  arms c o n t r o l  i n  Europe. 
They s e e  U.S. m i l i t a r y  moves toward China a s  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  
and a s  of marg ina l  u t i l i t y  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  when compared t o  t h e  
importance of major  U.S.-Soviet arms acco rds .  2 1  
Sov ie t  s p e c i a l i s t s  a r e  d iv ided  i n t o  two g e n e r a l  groups on t h i s  
i s s u e .  Some see  Sino-American m i l i t a r y  coope ra t i on  a s  c o n t r a r y  t o  
what t hey  judge should be t h e  pr imary U.S. goa l  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  an 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o rde r  based c h i e f l y  on a  Soviet-American modus v i v e n d i .  - 2 2 1  
Many o t h e r s ,  however, s e e  t h e  USSR a s  a  newly emerging g r e a t  power and 
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t he  United S t a t e s  should work c l o s e l y  wi th  o t h e r  sou rce s  
o f  world power--including China--in o r d e r  t o  p r ec lude  more Sov ie t  expans ion  
and encourage t he  USSR t o  a d j u s t  t o  and coope ra t e  wi th  t h e  s t a t u s  quo. They 
see  U.S. m i l i t a r y  coope ra t i on  wi th  China a s  u s e f u l  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t .  2 3 1  
211 Former U.S. Ambassador t o  Moscow, Malcolm Toon, vo iced  t h i s  
v i e w i n  tes t imony b e f o r e  t h e  House Fore ign  A f f a i r s  Committee on August 2 6 ,  
1980 .  
221 See i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  tes t imony of Raymond Gar thof f  o f  t h e  
~ r o o k i n ~ s  I n s t i t u t i o n  b e f o r e  t h e  House Fore ign  A f f a i r s  Committee on 
August 26, 1980. Marsha l l  Shulman has a l s o  been a  s t r o n g  proponent of 
t h l s  p o i n t  o f  view. 
2 3 1  Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  P r o f e s s o r  Richard P ipes  h a s  been outspoken 
i n  t h i s  r e g a r d .  
China specialists are also divided. Many are concerned with the 
negative impact a U.S. refusal to transfer military supplies would have 
on Sino-American bilateral relations. E/ But many other Chinese specialists 
worry about potential negative consequences of closer military cooperation 
with China for future Sino-American relations. g/ 
Of course, not all views of U.S. arms transfers to China are governed 
by the Soviet-U.S.-Chinese triangular relationship. Thus, for example, 
many Asian specialists have reflected the uneasiness of the countries of 
241 Several judge that the United States. might seriously disappoint 
the Chinese leaders by not following through with military supplies, after 
having given the Chinese the impression during visits and other inter- 
changes that such equipment would be forthcoming. Some of them add that 
the supply of limited amounts of weapons and weapons-related technology 
represents an effective way to consolidate relations with the Chinese 
leadership. Amicable Sino-American relations are seen as a most useful 
means to stabilize the situation in Asia in the face of possible internal 
and external challenges, including possible Soviet expansion. 
While this view has been held by several important China analysts 
in the U.S. Government in recent years, it has not been subject to much 
media attention. For a variation on this view, see Roger Brown's article 
listed in the last section of this study. 
251 Some worry about leadership instability in China or voice concern 
overChinese intentions toward their neighbors. U.S. military ties might 
identify the United States too closely with only one group in the Chinese 
leadership--a group whose tenure may be limited and whose successors may 
not be favorably disposed to the United States. 
Some analysts, who have been critical of recent developments in China, 
have been associated with this view. See in particular Ray Cline's analysis 
of the "China Card" in the Washington Star, October 14, 1980. 
Other China specialists stress that the Chinese may come to rely too 
much on the United States, or may find U.S. military equipment inappro- 
priate for China's military modernization--developments possibly leading 
to a severe downturn in U.S.-Chinese relations in the future. A. Doak 
Barnett and Allen Whiting voiced these kinds of reservations in testimony 
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 22, 1980. 
t h e  r e g i o n  o v e r  U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  c o o p e r a t i o n .  2 6 /  S p e c i a l i s t s  w i t h  -
p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  i n  Taiwan have  an o b v i o u s  s t r o n g  i n t e r e s t  i n  b l o c k i n g  
m i l i t a r y  t i e s  w i t h  Ch ina .  Meanwhile,  Americans  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  i n c r e a s e d  
t r a d e  w i t h  t h e  PRC h a v e  somet imes f a v o r e d  improved m i l i t a r y  t i e s  a s  a  means 
t o  show American good f a i t h  toward C h i n a ,  t o  i n s u r e  a  f r u i t f u l  economic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  t h e  PRC, and t o  b u i l d  C h i n a ' s  s e n s e  o f  s e c u r i t y .  271  - 
2 6 1  T h e i r  c o n c e r n s  f o c u s  on C h i n a ' s  i r r i d e n t i s t  c l a i m s  and i t s  
r o l e  a s  a  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  f o r c e  i n  t h e  r e g i o n - - f a c t o r s  t h a t  a r e  
s e e n  a s  p o s s i b l y  more d i f f i c u l t  t o  d e a l  w i t h  i f  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  seems 
t o  d e f e r  more t o  C h i n a ' s  i n t e r e s t s  i n  A s i a n  a f f a i r s .  
S t a n f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r o f e s s o r  H a r r y  Hard ing  h a s  u rged  t h a t  t h e r e  b e  
c l o s e r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  between t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and i t s  a l l i e s  i n  A s i a  on 
China p o l i c y  b e f o r e  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  b e g i n s  t o  s e l l  weapons o r  w e a p o n s - r e l a t e d  
t e c h n o l o g y  t o  Ch ina .  See h i s  t e s t i m o n y  b e f o r e  t h e  House F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  
Commit tee ,  September  25,  1980.  
2 7 /  These  deve lopments  r e p o r t e d l y  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e  l i k e l i h o o d  t h a t  
t h e  EC w i l l  p l a y  a  s t a b i l i z i n g  r a t h e r  t h a n  d i s r u p t i v e  r o l e  i n  t h e  econo- 
m i c a l l y  i m p o r t a n t  E a s t  As ian  r e g i o n .  T h i s  v iew was v o i c e d  by some U.S. 
b u s i n e s s  p e r s o n s  w i t h  a  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  E a s t  As ian  a f f a i r s .  
V .  ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF U.S. MILITARY SALES TO CHINA 
U.S. p o l i c y  makers i n  t h e  97 th  Congress and t h e  Reagan Admin- 
i s t r a t i o n  may w e l l  a l l ow  t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  views on t h e  U.S.-Soviet- 
Chinese r e l a t i o n s h i p  o r  t h e i r  s p e c i a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  U.S. f o r e i g n  p o l i c y ,  
( e . g . ,  Taiwan, t r a d e  w i th  China,  e t c . )  t o  i n f l u e n c e  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n s  on 
which of t h e  contending  s choo l s  of  thought  t h e y  w i l l  f a v o r  i n  r e g a r d  
t o  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China.  But t h e y  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  do s o  
w i thou t  c a r e f u l  review of what s p e c i a l i s t s  s e e  a s  t h e  main advantages  
and d i s advan t ages  of  such U.S. moves. T h i s  s e c t i o n  p rov ides  an  a n a l y s i s  
of t h e  perce ived  p ros  and cons of t h i s  p o l i c y  i n  o r d e r  t o  a s s i s t  p o l i c y  
makers and o t h e r s  i n  making up t h e i r  mind. It i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  two subsec-  
t i o n s ,  d e a l i n g  r e s p e c t i v e l y  w i th  s t r a t e g i c  advantages  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s  
and w i th  po l i t i c a l - economic  advantages  and d i s a d v a n t a g e s .  
A. S t r a t e g i c  Cons ide ra t i ons  
1. Pro: Some of t h e  s t r o n g e s t  arguments i n  f avo r  of  i n c r e a s e d  U.S. -
m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China c e n t e r  on t h e  e f f e c t  t h e y  a r e  s a i d  t o  have on 
Chinese and Sov ie t  s t r a t e g i c  p lanning .  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China ,  i t  
i s  a s s e r t e d ,  w i l l  f u r t h e r  i n s u r e  t h a t  China would remain on t h e  American s i d e  
a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR du r ing  t h e  pe r iod  of U.S. s t r a t e g i c  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  
y e a r s  ahead.  The t r a n s f e r s  would a l s o  s e r v e  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  American t i e s  
w i th  what i s  viewed a s  t h e  emerging g r e a t  power i n  Asia--China. A few 
m i l i t a r y  p l anne r s  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e  U.S. m i l i t a r y  moves w i l l  h e l p  pave t h e  
t h e  way t o  what t hey  s e e  a s  a  d e s i r e a b l e  and n e c e s s a r y  Sino-American mutua l  
security arrangement in Northeast Asia--an alliance system that they judge 
should also include Japan. 281 -
The U.S. military supplies would increase China's sense of security 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and reduce the chance that the USSR would be 
able to intimidate or otherwise pressure China into a more pro-Soviet 
foreign policy stance. A greater Chinese sense of security is said 
to be necessary before the United States can expect the PRC to join in 
serious discussions on limiting nuclear arms development. 
While the U.S. transfers are not seen as substantially altering 
China's ability to project power against the USSR, a number of analysts 
have said that such transfers could seriously complicate Soviet military 
plans in Asia. Moscow would not only have to devote more resources to 
countering whatever limited improvements are made in Chinese forces, but 
it would also have to worry more about conflict along its Asian front 
in the event of an East-West confrontation over Europe or the Middle East. 
Some analysts worry about the Soviet Union redeploying westward forces 
in Asia in the event of a crisis with the West in Europe. They add that 
such redeployments would be less likely under circumstances of closer Sino- 
American military cooperation. Closer military cooperation with China could 
also give the United States the option of using facilities in China (air 
fields, ports, etc.) in the event of a major confrontation with the USSR, 
281 These analysts are predictably vague in defining the outlines 
of this proposed mutual security arrangement, although they repeatedly 
compare it directly with the North Atlantic alliance. 
t he r eby  p l a c i n g  Sov ie t  c e n t r a l  As ia  and t h e  Fa r  Eas t  under  g r e a t e r  
p r e s s u r e  than  a t  p r e s e n t .  
Another s t r a t e g i c  advantage seen  by a  few a n a l y s t s  r e l a t e s  t o  
Japan .  Noting U.S. f r u s t r a t i o n  w i th  t h e  s lowness o f  t h e  J apanese  
de fense  development and t h e  seeming i n a b i l i t y  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  
e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  p r e s s u r e  Japan  on t h i s  i s s u e  f o r  f e a r  o f  a l i e n a t i n g  
our  most impor tan t  a l l y  i n  A s i a ,  t h e s e  o b s e r v e r s  s t r e s s  t h a t  c l o s e r  
m i l i t a r y  t i e s  w i th  China could  h e l p  i n  t h e s e  a r e a s .  They could  a l l o w  
t h e  United S t a t e s  more l a t i t u d e  i n  p r e s s u r i n g  t h e  Japanese  t o  do more 
i n  de fense  a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR, a s  w e l l  a s  i n  o t h e r  a r e a s ,  and could  
i n c r e a s e  t o  some deg ree  J a p a n ' s  s ense  of  v u l n e r a b i l i t y .  Th i s  f e e l i n g  
of  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  i s  d e s c r i b e d  a s  t h e  most impor t an t  e lement  i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  
Japan t o  g i v e  de fense  a  h i g h e r  p r i o r i t y .  
2 .  - Con: Opponents of U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  c o o p e r a t i o n  a r e  n o t  i m -  
p r e s sed  by t h e s e  supposed advantages  and p o i n t  t o  a  v a r i e t y  of  s t r a t e g i c  
d i s advan t ages  t h e y  s e e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  t i e s .  For  one 
t h i n g ,  C h i n a ' s  c u r r e n t  n u c l e a r  s t r a t e g i c  c a p a b i l i t y  i s  p o t e n t i a l l y  t h r e a -  
t e n i n g  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  and U.S. a i d  t o  C h i n a ' s  c o n v e n t i o n a l  f o r c e s  
could presumably a l l ow  t h e  PRC t o  devo te  more a t t e n t i o n  t o  deve lop ing  
s t r a t e g i c  weapons. China i s  s a i d  t o  be l i k e l y  over  t h e  l onge r  term t o  
pose a  t h r e a t  t o  U.S. i n t e r e s t s  i n  As i a .  As i t  g e t s  s t r o n g e r  w i t h  U.S. 
s u p p o r t ,  China may we l l  a c t  more i ndependen t ly  and a s s e r t i v e l y  and come 
i n t o  c o n f l i c t  w i th  some of i t s  ne ighbor s  whose i n t e r e s t s  a r e  c l o s e  t o  
t h o s e  o f  t h e  United S t a t e s .  Taiwan i s  t h e  most obvious a r e a  f o r  such 
c o n f l i c t .  29/ -
Close r  m i l i t a r y  coope ra t i on  w i th  China could  l e ad  t o  such n e g a t i v e  
consequences a s  even more Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y  p r e s s u r e  on China 301 o r  perhaps  a  - 
p u n i t i v e  Sov ie t  s t r i k e  a long  t h e  Chinese b o r d e r .  31/  The Sov ie t  coun te r -  -
moves, i f  s u c c e s s f u l ,  could  undercu t  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  pro-Western l e a d e r s h i p  
of China and d i s c r e d i t  t h o s e  Chinese o f f i c i a l s  who have l i nked  C h i n a ' s  
d e f e n s i v e  s t r a t e g y  t o  c l o s e  a s s o c i a t i o n  wi th  t h e  United S t a t e s .  32/ - 
29/ For i n s t a n c e ,  i t  i s  c laimed t h a t  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China 
m i g h t s o  i n c r e a s e  C h i n a ' s  perce ived  l eve rage  over  t h e  United S t a t e s  i n  As ia  t h a t  
Peking might t a k e  more f o r c e f u l  act ions--such a s  a  nava l  blockade--against  
t h e  i s l a n d .  U.S. arms a r e  no t  thought  t o  i n c r e a s e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  t h e  PRC 
a b i l i t y  t o  conduct  such an o p e r a t i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  f o r  s e v e r a l  y e a r s .  But t h e  
t r a n s f e r s  could  s i g n a l  Peking ,  Taiwan and Taiwan's  l e a d i n g  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r s  
of a  s h i f t  i n  U.S. p r i o r i t i e s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n ,  sugges t i ng  t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  
would no t  r e a c t  s t r o n g l y  t o  such a  PRC r e s o r t  t o  f o r c e  a g a i n s t  t h e  i s l a n d .  
I n  t he  even t  of a  PRC blockade--which i s  thought  by many t o  be w i t h i n  t h e  
range  of  C h i n a ' s  c u r r e n t  m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s - - t h e  United S t a t e s  would 
have t o  dec ide  whether t o  c o n f r o n t  i t s  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  impor tan t  f r i e n d  
i n  As ia  o r  a l l ow  Taiwan t o  be p r e s su red  i n t o  an accommodation w i th  t h e  
mainland.  
30/ Some a n a l y s t s  would welcome an i n c r e a s e  i n  Sov ie t  deployments 
a g a i n s t  China because t hey  would reduce Sov ie t  a b i l i t y  t o  c o n f r o n t  t h e  
West e l s ewhe re .  
311 While a  few a n a l y s t s  s e e  Moscow a s  p o s s i b l y  r e a c t i n g  immediately 
w i t h f o r c e  t o  U.S. s a l e s  t o  China,  o t h e r s  s t r e s s  t h a t  Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y  
p l a n n e r s  have no t  been r a s h  i n  t h e i r  m i l i t a r y  a c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  China.  
Seve ra l  have added t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  should be wary t h a t  even through 
Sov ie t  p l a n n e r s  may appear  c a u t i o u s ,  U.S. m i l i t a r y  coope ra t i on  could  qu i ck ly  
b u i l d  t o  a  po in t  where i t  would c r o s s  an i l l - d e f i n e d  " th r e sho ld"  o f  Sov ie t  
t o l e r a n c e ,  l e a d i n g  t o  a  ha r sh  m i l i t a r y  response  a g a i n s t  China,  and p o s s i b l y ,  
t h e  United S t a t e s .  
32/ Some China s p e c i a l i s t s  argue t h a t  China i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  change i t s  
a n t i z o v i e t  p o s t u r e  and w i l l  con t i nue  t o  t i e  down Sov ie t  f o r c e s ,  whether  o r  
no t  t h e  United S t a t e s  i n c r e a s e s  m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  t h e  PRC. They t h e r e f o r e  
s e e  l i t t l e  need f o r  t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  r i s k  t h e  p o s s i b l e  d i s a v a n t a g e s  o f  
c l o s e r  U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  t i e s .  
The USSR could  r e a c t  t o  U.S. t r a n f e r s  o f  m i l i t a r y  s u p p l i e s  t o  China 
w i th  countermeasures  i nvo lv ing  Vietnam o r  p o s s i b l y  I n d i a ,  perhaps  i n c l u d i n g  
s tepped  up e f f o r t s  t o  e s t a b l i s h  Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y  i n s t a l l a t i o n s  i n  Sou theas t  
and South As i a .  These moves n o t  on ly  would h e l p  t h e  USSR t o  e n c i r c l e  
China and curb  Chinese i n f l u e n c e  i n  As i a ,  bu t  t hey  would a l s o  s e r i o u s l y  
c h a l l e n g e  t h e  a b i l i t y  of t h e  United S t a t e s  t o  defend s e a  l i n e s  of  commu- 
n i c a t i o n s  i n  t h e s e  impor tan t  a r e a s .  U .  S.  moves toward m i l i t a r y  t i e s  w i th  
China could s e r i o u s l y  dampen Sov ie t  i n t e r e s t  i n  arms c o n t r o l  w i th  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  and upse t  e x i s t i n g  East-West unde r s t and ings  f o r  t h e s e  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  Moscow would be more l i k e l y  t o  demand compensat ion i n  any 
disarmament p roposa l  due t o  Chinese n u c l e a r  forces--something t h e  United 
S t a t e s  h a s  r e j e c t e d  i n  t h e  p a s t .  
B.  Po l i t i ca l -Economic  F a c t o r s  
1. Pro: Perhaps t h e  s t r o n g e s t  p o l i t i c a l  argument f o r  go ing  ahead w i th  -
l i m i t e d  m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China i s  t h a t  U.S. l e a d e r s  have a p p a r e n t l y  
a l r e a d y  g iven  Chinese o f f i c i a l s  t h e  impres s ion  t h a t  t h e y  would do s o .  To 
r e v e r s e  cou r se  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  could  l e ad  t o  s e r i o u s  compl i ca t i ons  i n  Sino- 
American r e l a t i o n s .  The t r a n s f e r s  would show American "good f a i t h , "  b u i l d  
suppor t  f o r  and e s t a b l i s h  American i n f l u e n c e  w i th  t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  pragmat ic  
l e a d e r s  c u r r e n t l y  governing China,  and promote impor t an t  channe l s  o f  communi- 
c a t i o n s  w i th  segments of t h e  Chinese m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s h i p  who might  o t h e r w i s e  
r emain  s k e p t i c a l  o f  C h i n a ' s  r e c e n t  t i l t  toward t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s .  3 3 1  - 
I t  i s  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  p r e p a r i n g  such  a  s o l i d  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  Sino-American 
t i e s  i s  e s s e n t i a l  i n  o r d e r  t o  p e r m i t  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  w i t h s t a n d  f u t u r e  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  o v e r  such  i s s u e s  a s  Taiwan,  341 U.S.-Sovie t  arms c o n t r o l  and -
human r i g h t s .  
M i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  Ch ina  a r e  a l s o  s a i d  t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  w i t h  a  "China c a r d "  u s e f u l  i n  p romot ing  more p o s i t i v e  S o v i e t  
b e h a v i o r  toward t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  o r  i n  compensa t ing  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
f o r  S o v i e t  g a i n s  made e l s e w h e r e  i n  t h e  T h i r d  World.  They r e p o r t e d l y  
have  i n d i r e c t  a d v a n t a g e s  f o r  U.S. t r a d e  w i t h  Ch ina ,  a s  China i s  s a i d  
t o  b e  l i k e l y  t o  g i v e  b u s i n e s s  p e o p l e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i t s  m a j o r  m i l i t a r y  
b a c k e r  more a d v a n t a g e o u s  t r e a t m e n t  t h a n  t h e i r  c o m p e t i t o r s  from o t h e r  coun- 
t r i e s .  3 5 /  C l o s e r  m i l i t a r y  t i e s  w i t h  Ch ina  c o u l d  r e d u c e  U.S. dependency -
331  I t  h a s  been n o t e d  by some t h a t  Ch inese  m i l i t a r y  l e a d e r s  have  r e c e i v e d  
l e s s b e n e f i t  t h a n  o t h e r  PRC l e a d e r s  from C h i n a ' s  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  program o r  
i t s  o p e n i n g  t o  t h e  West;  t h e y  t h e r e f o r e  would have l e s s  t o  l o s e ,  and 
p o s s i b l y  more t o  g a i n ,  i f  t h a t  program and C h i n a ' s  p r a g m a t i c ,  r e l a t i v e l y  
pro-Western l e a d e r s h i p  under  Deng Xiaop ing  were  changed .  American c o n c e r n  
o v e r  t h e  l o y a l t y  o f  C h i n a ' s  m i l i t a r y  t o  t h e  c u r r e n t  Deng Xiaop ing  l e a d e r s h i p  
i n  Pek ing  was i n c r e a s e d  i n  l a t e  1980 by p r e s s  r e p o r t s  t h a t  D e n g ' s  o p p o n e n t s  
were t r y i n g  t o  a p p e a l  t o  t h e  m i l i t a r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  u n d e r c u t  Deng ' s  programs 
and t o  s a v e  t h e i r  own l e a d e r s h i p  p o s i t i o n s .  
3 4 1  It i s  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  c a n n o t  e x p e c t  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  China t o  
r e m a i n  c o r d i a l  i f  i t  c o n t i n u e s - - a s  e x p e c t e d - - t o  s e l l  hundreds  o f  m i l l i o n s  o f  
d o l l a r s  wor th  o f  m i l i t a r y  equ ipment  t o  Taiwan w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  a  d e  f a c t o  arms 
embargo a g a i n s t  t h e  PRC. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  some s a y  t h a t  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  c o u l d  
a v o i d  a  downturn i n  U.S.-China r e l a t i o n s  and s t i l l  go ahead  w i t h  t h e  p roposed  
s a l e  o f  t h e  FX f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t  t o  Taiwan by  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  a l l o w i n g  t h e  
t r a n s f e r  t o  Ch ina  o f  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  U.S. a i r c r a f t  e n g i n e  t e c h n o l o g y  needed 
f o r  t h e  PRC f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t  program.  
351 One China s p e c i a l i s t  went f u r t h e r  i n  t h i s  r e g a r d ,  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  
c h i n a g i v e s  b e t t e r  t r e a t m e n t  and more a d v a n t a g e o u s  t r a d e  t o  t h o s e  i n d i v i d u a l  
American companies  which have been most h e l p f u l  i n  p romot ing  U.S. m i l i t a r y  
t r a n s f e r s  t o  Ch ina .  
on Japan and i n c r e a s e  U .  S .  l e v e r a g e  over  t h e  Japanese  on a  v a r i e t y  of 
i s s u e s ,  i n c l u d i n g  U.S.-Japanese t r a d e  d i s ag reemen t s .  361 
2 .  - Con: Opponents o f  m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  r a i s e  a  h o s t  o f  p o s s i b l e  
p o l i t i c a l  and economic d i s advan t ages  t o  such t i e s .  They could  l ock  
t h e  United S t a t e s  i n t o  an an t i -Sov ie t  p o s t u r e  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a f f a i r s  
a t  a  t ime when t h e  United S t a t e s  may have more t o  g a i n  from coopera-  
t i o n  t h a n  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  wi th  t h e  USSR. T h i s  could  happen even i f  t h e  
United S t a t e s  wanted on ly  a  l i m i t e d  m i l i t a r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  t h e  PRC, 
because  such r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  once s t a r t e d ,  deve lop  r a p i d l y  and prove 
d i f f i c u l t  t o  s t o p .  
The t r a n s f e r s  could  l i n k  t h e  United S t a t e s  c l o s e l y  w i th  t h e  Chinese 
s i d e  of  t h e  Sino-Soviet  d i s p u t e  i n  As i a ,  n o t a b l y  r educ ing  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  
more independent  U .  S. p o l i c i e s  v i s - a -v i s  Vietnam o r  I n d i a .  They could  
promote a  view t h a t  t h e  United S t a t e s  pe rce ived  China,  r a t h e r  t h a n  J a p a n ,  
a s  i t s  main a l l y  i n  As i a ,  t h e r b y  l e a d i n g  t o  an e r o s i o n  of  t h e  U.S.- J apan  
A l l i a n c e .  They could  s i g n a l  a  l o s s  of U.S. i n f l u e n c e  i n  As i a ,  371 a s  
w e l l  a s  a  l o s s  i n  i n f l u e n c e  over  Ch ina ' s  f u t u r e  b e h a v i o r .  The l a t t e r  
would be even more l i k e l y  i f  t h e  United S t a t e s  agreed  t o  coproduct ion- type  
a r rangements  w i th  China t h a t  would a l l ow  t h e  Chinese t o  have f u l l  c o n t r o l  
361 A few o b s e r v e r s  have claimed t h a t  J a p a n ' s  l e a d e r s  have  been 
a rgu ing  a g a i n s t  U.S. arms s a l e s  t o  China i n  p a r t  f o r  s e l f i s h  
r ea sons .  The Japanese a l l e g e d l y  judge t h a t  i f  t h e  United S t a t e s  moves 
ahead w i th  such s a l e s ,  China w i l l  f avo r  U.S. businessmen over  J apanese  
businessmen on p o t e n t i a l l y  l u c r a t i v e  t r a d e  d e a l s .  
3 7 1  One Asian s p e c i a l i s t  s a i d  t h a t  some of  t h e  ASEAN c o u n t r i e s ,  i n  -
response  t o  U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  t i e s ,  would beg in  t o  r e a s s e s s  t h e i r  v iew 
of t h e  Sov ie t  p resence  i n  Sou theas t  As ia  and might  come t o  s e e  t h e  USSR 
and i t s  a l l y ,  Vietnam, a s  a  u s e f u l  b u f f e r  t o  growing Chinese power i n  
t h e  r e g i o n .  S e v e r a l  o t h e r  a n a l y s t s  exp re s sed  doubt  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s f e r  
of arms t o  China would a u t o m a t i c a l l y  r e s u l t  i n  such a  s h i f t  o f  ASEAN 
a t t i t u d e .  
ove r  t h e  use  of weapons produced w i th  technology  s u p p l i e d  by t h e  
United S t a t e s .  E/ 
I n  view of Ch ina ' s  h i s t o r y  of  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  a  new l e a d e r s h i p  l e s s  f a v o r a b l e  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s  could 
emerge i n  China over  t h e  nex t  few y e a r s .  The example of  Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y  
c o o p e r a t i o n  w i th  China i n  t h e  1950s i s  a l s o  n o t  r e a s s u r i n g ,  a s  i t  seemed 
t o  prompt u n r e a l i s t i c  Chinese e x p e c t a t i o n s  which t h e  USSR was u n w i l l i n g  
t o  f u l f i l l .  Th i s  l e d  t o  a  s e r i o u s  downturn i n  r e l a t i o n s - - a  p a t t e r n  which 
could be fol lowed i n  Sino-American r e l a t i o n s  du r ing  t h e  1980 ' s  i f  t h e  
China army l e a d e r s  and o t h e r  Chinese o f f i c i a l s  come t o  r e l y  too  h e a v i l y  
on American s u p p l i e s  and s u p p o r t .  E/ 
38/  Even some a n a l y s t s  who f avo r  arms t r a n s f e r s  t o  China a rgue  t h a t  
s u c h s a l e s  should  be seen  on ly  a s  a  supplement t o ,  no t  a  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r ,  
U.S. power i n  t he  r eg ion .  Otherwise ,  t hey  warn, t h e  United S t a t e s  would 
become t o o  dependent  on China t o  p r o t e c t  U.S. i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n .  
However, o t h e r s  f avo r ing  Sino-American s e c u r i t y  t i e s  judge t h a t  i t  i s  
u n r e a l i s t i c  t o  expec t  t h e  United S t a t e s  no t  t o  u se  China a s  a  s u b s t i t u t e  
f o r  U.S. power i n  Eas t  Asia  t o  some deg ree .  They emphasize t h a t  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  needs t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  i t s  f o r c e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e a l  w i th  t h e  USSR 
i n  o t h e r  impor tan t  a r e a s ,  n o t a b l y  t h e  P e r s i a n  Gul f ,  and t h a t  i t  should 
use  China a s  a  s t r a t e g i c  bulwark i n  Eas t  As i a .  Some no t e  t h a t  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  i n  e f f e c t  has  a l r e a d y  s t a r t e d  t h i s  kind of approach i n  Sou theas t  
A s i a ,  where China--and no t  t h e  United S t a t e s - - i s  seen a s  t h e  main s t r a t e g i c  
g u a r a n t o r  of American i n t e r e s t s  i n  Thai land  a g a i n s t  m i l i t a r y  p r e s s u r e  
from Soviet-backed Vietnam. 
Meanwhile, s e v e r a l  o b s e r v e r s  have poin ted  ou t  t h a t  many of t h e  
d i s advan t ages  of U.S. arms s a l e s  t o  China could  be overcome i f  West 
Europeans--not Americans--sold arms t o  China.  But o t h e r s  have added 
t h a t  t h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  f r e q u e n t l y  have shown themselves t o  be ve ry  s e n s i -  
t i v e  t o  Sov ie t  p r e s s u r e  no t  t o  s e l l  arms t o  t he  PRC--pressure t h a t  
would presumably have l e s s  e f f e c t  on t h e  United S t a t e s .  
39/ Some a n a l y s t s  c l a im  t h a t  Chinese l e a d e r s  l a c k  a  f i xed  and v i a b l e  
de fense  s t r a t e g y  and t h a t  U.S. m i l i t a r y  s u p p l i e s  could prove t o  be l e s s  than  
f u l l y  u s e f u l  i f  Chinese de fense  p l ans  changed i n  t he  f u t u r e .  Chinese 
l e a d e r s  might  t h e n  be i n c l i n e d  t o  blame the  United S t a t e s  f o r  t r a n s f e r r i c g  
" i n a p p r o p r i a t e "  equipment a t  g r e a t  c o s t  t o  Ch ina ' s  l i m i t e d  economic r e s o u r c e s .  
China i s  a l s o  seen  a s  g a i n i n g  much more t h a n  i t  g i v e s  i n  i t s  
new r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  t h e  United S t a t e s .  Some s t r e s s  t h e  c o n t r a s t  
between t h e  r i s k s  t h e  United S t a t e s  would t a k e  i n  i n c r e a s i n g  m i l i t a r y  
t i e s  wi th  China and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  Americans would s t i l l  have no 
g u a r a n t e e  t h a t  China would be any more l i k e l y  t o  s i d e  w i th  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  on i s s u e s  impor tan t  t o  American i n t e r e s t s  v i s -a -v is  t h e  S o v i e t  
Union o r  e l sewhere .  
VI. PROSPECTS AND OPTIONS 
Members of the 97th Congress and the Reagan Administration will 
be buffeted by cross currents of political opinion as they attempt to 
deal with the issue of increased U.S. military supplies to China in the 
months ahead. Recent trends in U.S.-Soviet-Chinese relations seem to 
favor those Americans who wish to transfer more military equipment and 
arms to China. Support for such sales is likely to build so long as U.S. 
relations with the Soviet Union remain characterized more by hostility 
than by cooperation, U.S. relations with China continue along their rapid 
evolution toward closer friendship, and Sino-Soviet relations remain 
stalemated. 
The Chinese, for their part, appear likely to continue to press 
the United States for more advanced military equipment and technology. 
A flat U.S. refusal to sell such material to China would almost certainly 
prompt expressions of strong disappointment by Chinese leaders, who would 
see it as a clear sign of America's lack of trust of China and U.S. 
determination to maintain an "arms embargo" against the PRC. When taken 
together with the Reagan Administration's well known differences with 
Peking over U.S.-Taiwan relations, the refusal could lead to a serious 
downturn in Sino-American relations. 
The main worry about the military transfers concerns their symbolic 
importance, especially their implications for future U. S. policy toward 
China and their meaning for American relations with the USSR, Japan, and 
o t h e r  As ian  s t a t e s .  Here l i e s  what many c u r r e n t l y  s e e  a s  t h e  g r e a t e s t  
c h a l l e n g e  t o  American p o l i c y  makers i n  d e a l i n g  wi th  China. 
The i n c r e m e n t a l l y  deve loping  American s e c u r i t y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  
China over  t h e  p a s t  decade has  from time t o  time l e d  t o  mi spe rcep t ions  
of U.S. i n t e n t i o n s  on t h e  p a r t  o f  American i n t e r e s t  g roups ,  t h e  Sov ie t  
Union, Asian c o u n t r i e s  and even t h e  Chinese l e a d e r s .  I f  U.S. l e a d e r s  
m a i n t a i n  a  vagueness  about  Ch ina ' s  p l ace  i n  American s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y  
whi le  moving ahead wi th  more m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China,  v a r i o u s  
i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  could  make t oo  extreme an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of U.S. 
o b j e c t i v e s ;  t h e i r  r e a c t i o n s  could we l l  be c o n t r a r y  t o  American i n t e r e s t s .  
Thus, Chinese l e a d e r s  might  i n c o r r e c t l y  s e e  such t r a n s f e r s  a s  s i g n a l i n g  
a  major  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  of what they  may view a s  America 's  commitment t o  
p r o t e c t  C h i n a ' s  s e c u r i t y  a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR. Sov ie t  l e a d e r s  might p e r c e i v e  
them a s  t h e  consumation of a  d e f a c t o  U.S.-China m i l i t a r y  a l l i a n c e  t h a t  
must be a c t i v e l y  r e s i s t e d  by t h e  USSR. Japan and o t h e r  U.S. a l l i e s  and 
f r i e n d s  i n  Asia  could s e e  them a s  s i g n a l i n g  a  fundamental s h i f t  i n  American 
i n t e r e s t  i n  As i a ,  away from them and toward t h e  PRC a s  t h e  main backer  of  
American s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t he  r e g i o n .  
By c o n t r a s t ,  a  d i f f e r e n t  approach ,  which would a l l ow  t h e  United S t a t e s  
t o  make c l e a r e r  t o  t he  v a r i o u s  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  t h e  l i m i t e d  o b j e c t i v e s  
of  i t s  China p o l i c y ,  could reduce  p o s s i b l e  adverse  consequences f o r  U.S. 
i n t e r e s t s .  Under t h e s e  c i r cums tances ,  t h e  United S t a t e s  would a g r e e  t o  
i n c r e a s e  t o  a c a r e f u l l y  l i m i t e d  degree  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  t o  China,  
i n c l u d i n g  some d e f e n s i v e  weapons o r  r e l a t e d  technology .  It would use  t h e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  s e r v e  n o t i c e  t o  Peking t h a t  t h e  Chinese l e a d e r s  should expec t  
no more such military help until Sino-American relations have matured over 
several more years. This policy would remain in effect barring a gross 
change in the international balance of power or a substantial increase in 
Soviet military power in Asia designed to pressure China into a less pro- 
American posture. The United States could continue to solidify its ties 
with China in economic and political areas which are seen as having little 
negative consequence for U.S. interests. 
It would be particularly important to clarify the limits of 
Sino-American military cooperation to the leaders of the Soviet Union. 
It could be noted in conversations with the Soviets that U.S. supplies 
to China are in part governed by a desire to maintain, but not to 
narrow substantially, the current gap in the military capabilities of 
Sino-Soviet forces along China's northern border. Thus, Moscow would 
know that any major Soviet effort to expand its military power in Asia in 
order to intimidate China would likely prompt increased U.S. support for 
China's military modernization. 
Japan and other Asian states would also have to be reassured. A solid 
consensus in the United States in support of the limited military relation- 
ship with China would appear to be required. Such a consensus might prove 
difficult to build, and yet remain within the confines of the limited 
military relationship noted above. In particular, some in the Congress 
may be inclined to ask for a "quid pro quo" for U.S. military help to 
China. While this could involve preferential treatment of U.S. business 
representatives in trade with China, some U.S. representatives might demand 
that the United States be compensated with increased military access to 
China,  such  a s  w i th  ba s ing  r i g h t s  o r  i n t e l l i g e n c e  g a t h e r i n g  f a c i l i t i e s .  
Of c o u r s e ,  such a  move would be more l i k e l y  t o  i n c r e a s e  t h e  r i s k s  of  Sov ie t  
and o t h e r  f o r e i g n  r e a c t i o n s  c o n t r a r y  t o  U.S. i n t e r e s t s .  
Another o p t i o n  i s  t o  use  l i m i t e d  m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  a s  t h e  f i r s t  i n  
a  s e r i e s  o f  s t e p s  l e a d i n g  t o  some s o r t  o f  mutual  s e c u r i t y  arrangement  
wi th  China a g a i n s t  t h e  USSR. These s t e p s  could i n c l u d e  U.S. t r a i n i n g  
of Chinese m i l i t a r y  pe r sonne l ,  t h e  s t a t i o n i n g  of American m i l i t a r y  
e x p e r t s  i n  China,  t h e  presence  of  U.S. i n t e l l i g e n c e  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  China,  
Sino-American maneuvers and e x e r c i s e s ,  and U.S. p lanning  wi th  Chinese 
f o r c e s .  While such an approach would c l e a r l y  have a t  l e a s t  a  s h o r t  term 
p o s i t i v e  impact on U.S.-China r e l a t i o n s ,  i t  would make almost  imposs ib l e  
any l a s t i n g  U.S r e a s s u r a n c e  of t h e  Sov ie t  Union and o t h e r  i n t e r e s t e d  Asian 
n a t i o n s  ove r  American i n t e n t i o n s  toward China. Should U.S. p l anne r s  pursue  
t h i s  o p t i o n ,  t h e y  probably  should  con t inue  an ambiguous and s e c r e t i v e  
p o l i c y  i n  r e g a r d  t o  U.S.-China s e c u r i t y  t i e s .  As no ted  above, such a  p o l i c y  
c a r r i e s  t h e  r i s k  of prompting extreme i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e a c t i o n s  -- r e a c t i o n s  
which could  s e r i o u s l y  compl i ca t e  American i n t e r e s t s  bo th  a t  home and abroad .  
I n  s h o r t ,  U.S. r e f u s a l  t o  s e l l  any weapons o r  r e l a t e d  technology  t o  
China could  s e r i o u s l y  a f f e c t  Sino-American r e l a t i o n s  and ,  by e x t e n t i o n ,  
a  v a r i e t y  of  impor tan t  U.S. i n t e r e s t s  i n  world a f f a i r s .  But t h e  r i s k s  
of  moving ahead wi th  such sales--whether  o r  no t  t h e y  a r e  des igned  t o  
f o s t e r  a  c l o s e  Sino-American mutual  s e c u r i t y  arrangement a g a i n s t  t h e  Sov ie t  
Union--will remain g r e a t  s o  long a s  U.S. l e a d e r s  remain vague about  t h e  
o b j e c t i v e s  of t h e i r  s t r a t e g i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  China. The r i s k s  of a  
c a r e f u l l y  l i m i t e d  U.S. m i l i t a r y  t r a n s f e r  t o  China could  be reduced sub- 
s t a n t i a l l y  i f  U.S. l e a d e r s  s h i f t e d  t o  a  more c l e a r l y  de f ined  p o l i c y  of  
moderate U.S. o b j e c t i v e s  toward China t h a t  could  a s s u r e  f r i e n d s  and foes  
a l i k e  of  American i n t e n t i o n s  toward t h e  PRC. 
V I I .  APPENDIX 
I .  Ch ina ' s  Defense S t r a t e g y  and Force  P o s t u r e  
The Chinese  b a s e  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l  d e f e n s e  s t r a t e g y  on d e t e r r i n g  a n  
a t t a c k  by making i t  too  c o s t l y  f o r  a  p o t e n t i a l  enemy. They have imple- 
mented t h i s  s t r a t e g y  by b u i l d i n g  a  modest b u t  c r e d i b l e  n u c l e a r  f o r c e  
and l a r g e  conven t iona l  armed f o r c e s  capab l e  of f i g h t i n g  a  p r o t r a c t e d  
war. 401 
A. S t r a t e g i c  Programs 
C h i n a ' s  n u c l e a r  d e t e r r e n t  c o n s i s t s  o f  manned bombers and a  sma l l  
b u t  growing b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  f o r c e .  The l i g h t  and medium bomber u n i t s  
a r e  no t  seen  a s  t r a i n e d  and organized  a s  a  n u c l e a r  s t r i k e  f o r c e ,  b u t  
t h e y  could  d e l i v e r  n u c l e a r  bombs on t a r g e t s  c l o s e  t o  t h e  b o r d e r s .  
The m i s s i l e  f o r c e  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  few dozen CSSl MRBMs and CSS2 
IRBMs deployed i n  a  semimobile o r  o t h e r  mode t o  enhance t h e i r  s u r v i v -  
a b i l i t y .  A few CSS3 ICBMs a r e  a l s o  i n  u s e .  These m i s s i l e s  could  
r e a c h  Moscow. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  China h a s  made p r o g r e s s  i n  deve lop ing  
a  t r u l y  i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  system t h a t  w i l l  enab l e  
401 P u b l i c a t i o n s  g i v i n g  d e t a i l e d  i n fo rma t ion  on Chinese and S o v i e t  
f o r c e d e p l o y m e n t s  a r e  no ted  i n  t h e  s e l e c t e d  r e a d i n g s  s e c t i o n  a t  t h e  
end of t h i s  s t udy .  F igu re s  used h e r e  a r e  taken  from The M i l i t a r y  
Balance,  1980-1981, I n s t i t u t e  f o r  S t r a t e g i c  S t u d i e s ,  London, 1980. 
Among books and a r t i c l e s  of p a r t i c u l a r  u s e ,  s e e  John M .  C o l l i n s ,  
U.S.-Soviet M i l i t a r y  Balance,  1960-1980; P e t e r  Young, "China ' s  M i l i -  
t a r y  C a p a b i l i t i e s , "  Asian Defense J o u r n a l ,  Feb rua ry ,  1979; U.S. Con- 
g r e s s .  Sena t e  Fore ign  R e l a t i o n s  Committee, "Sino-American R e l a t i o n s :  
A New Turn"; and Angus F r a s e r ,  " M i l i t a r y  Modern iza t ion  i n  China,"  
Problems of  Communism, September-December, 1979. 
t h e  PRC t o  d e l i v e r  n u c l e a r  warheads on t a r g e t s  a lmost  anywhere i n  t h e  
wor ld ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c o n t i n e n t a l  United S t a t e s .  The CSS4 ICBM h a s  
been t e s t e d  s u c c e s s f u l l y  and may become o p e r a t i o n a l  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .  
China i s  a l s o  deve loping  a  network of  r a d a r s  t o  provide  a l l -a round 
e a r l y  warning of  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  a t t a c k .  And i t  has  pursued a  space  
program which has  p laced  a  h igh  p r i o r i t y  on deve loping  s a t e l l i t e s  f o r  
i n t e l l i g e n c e  c o l l e c t i o n  purposes .  
B. Genera l  Purpose Forces  
The Chinese have one of t h e  l a r g e s t  conven t iona l  armed f o r c e s  i n  
t h e  world--over 4  m i l l i o n  men. They do not  pose a  d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  
t h r e a t  t o  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  bu t  t hey  could  a t t a c k  U.S. ba se s  and U.S. 
a l l i e s  i n  t h e  Far  E a s t .  Peking c o n s i d e r s  t h e  Sovie t  Union t o  be i t s  
most dangerous p o t e n t i a l  adve r sa ry .  About h a l f  o f  t h e  armed f o r c e s  
a r e  a r r ayed  i n  a  d e f e n s i v e  p o s t u r e  t o  meet t h e  Sov ie t  t h r e a t .  Ano- 
t h e r  t h i r d  of t h e  f o r c e s  a r e  l o c a t e d  a long  t h e  c o a s t  and nea r  Vietnam, 
where Peking c o n t i n u e s  t o  p e r c e i v e  a  t h r e a t .  Most o f  t h e  remainder  
a r e  l o c a t e d  i n  c e n t r a l  China a s  a  r e s e r v e ;  on ly  a  few u n i t s  a r e  i n  
wes t e rn  China and T i b e t .  
1. Employment f o r  A t t ack  
Without t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  of  t h e  United S t a t e s  o r  USSR, China could overwhelm 
i t s  s m a l l e r  ne ighbor s .  Agains t  t h e  Sovie t  Union, Taiwan o r  I n d i a ,  however, 
i t s  conven t iona l  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  would be hampered by i nadequac i e s  i n  f i r epower ,  
m o b i l i t y  and l o g i s t i c s ,  a s  we l l  a s  by geog raph ica l  and t opog raph ica l  f a c t o r s .  
The v a s t  d i s t a n c e s  involved  and t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  Sov ie t  f o r c e s  a long  
t h e  bo rde r  would a l l ow t h e  Chinese t o  make a t  b e s t  o n l y  sha l low incu r -  
s i o n s  i n t o  t h e  USSR. The Taiwan S t r a i t  i s  s t i l l  an  e f f e c t i v e  b a r r i e r  
a g a i n s t  a  Chinese i nvas ion  of Taiwan. The d i f f i c u l t  t e r r a i n  o f  T i b e t  
and capab le  I n d i a n  de fenses  would l i m i t  any a t t a c k  a g a i n s t  I n d i a .  I n d i a n  
t r o o p s  would be defending  t h e i r  own t e r r i t o r y  over  l i n e s  of  communication 
much s h o r t e r  t han  t h e  Chinese;  i f  t h e  I n d i a n s  were de termined ,  t h e  Chinese  
would not  be a b l e  t o  mount and s u s t a i n  an o f f e n s i v e  through T i b e t  w i th  a  
f o r c e  l a r g e  enough t o  d e f e a t  them. 
2.  Employment f o r  Defense 
To coun te r  an invader  wi th  s u p e r i o r  f i repower  and m o b i l i t y ,  t h e  
Chinese would employ d i s t a n c e  and t e r r a i n .  They do n o t  appear  t o  in-  
tend  t o  g ive  up t e r r i t o r y  e a s i l y ,  b u t  t o  wear down t h e  a t t a c k e r s  a s  
t h e y  t r y  t o  d r i v e  through s u c c e s s i v e  l i n e s  o f  i n c r e a s i n g l y  s t r o n g e r  
f o r c e s .  The Chinese con t inue  t o  emphasize d i s p e r s a l ,  redundancy and 
o t h e r  p a s s i v e  de fense  measures t o  improve t h e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  o f  m i l i -  
t a r y  i n d u s t r i e s  and c e r t a i n  elements  of  t h e  armed f o r c e s .  
The s h e e r  s i z e  of  C h i n a ' s  s t a n d i n g  armed f o r c e s  compensates t o  
some degree  f o r  t h e i r  inadequacies .  Moreover, t h e  v a s t  m o b i l i z a t i o n  
p o t e n t i a l  would provide  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e s o u r c e s  d u r i n g  a  prolonged war. 
China has  between 5-10 m i l l i o n  l i g h t l y  armed men organized  i n  para-  
m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  They could be used p r i m a r i l y  t o  wage g u e r r i l l a  
wa r fa re ,  suppor t  r e g u l a r  f o r c e s ,  and ma in t a in  i n t e r n a l  s e c u r i t y .  They 
could no t  be t u rned  i n t o  r e g u l a r  f o r c e s  q u i c k l y ;  China does  n o t  have 
enough heavy weapons and could no t  t u r n  them out  r a p i d l y  i n  t h e  number 
t h a t  would be needed. 
3.  Ground Forces  
C h i n a ' s  r e g u l a r  army c o n s i s t s  o f  approximate ly  3.5 m i l l i o n  men o r -  
gan ized  i n t o  main and r e g i o n a l  f o r c e s .  Main f o r c e s  c o n s i s t  o f  about  130 
combat d i v i s i o n s ,  mos t l y  i n f a n t r y ,  and 40 combat suppor t  d i v i s i o n s .  The 
combat d i v i s i o n s  a r e  t h e  b e s t  equipped and most mobi le  o f  t h e  ground f o r c e s .  
They have most Of t h e  e s t i m a t e d  10,000 t anks  i n  C h i n a ' s  i n v e n t o r y ,  and 
bo th  t h e i r  t ank  and a r t i l l e r y  e lements  a r e  g r a d u a l l y  be ing  upgraded. T h e i r  
pr imary m i s s i o n s  a r e  t o  h a l t  enemy p e n e t r a t i o n s  and t o  launch  c o u n t e r a t t a c k s  
o r  o f f e n s i v e s .  
The r e g i o n a l  f o r c e s ,  w i t h  ove r  80 d i v i s i o n s ,  a r e  o rgan i zed ,  armed 
and t r a i n e d  f o r  de f ense  o f  s p e c i f i c  a r e a s .  Some o f  t h e  r e g i o n a l  d i v i -  
s i o n s  man e l a b o r a t e  f i x e d  d e f e n s e s ,  which have been e s t a b l i s h e d  on 
t h e  major  avenues o f  approach.  
Most o f  t h e  ground f o r c e  equipment produced by C h i n a ' s  new i n d u s t r y  
i s  based on o l d e r  Sov ie t  d e s i g n s .  Though u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d  by U.S. o r  
Sov ie t  s t a n d a r d s ,  t h e  sma l l  arms, t a n k s ,  and a r t i l l e r y  a r e  rugged,  
r e l i a b l e  and g e n e r a l l y  adequate  f o r  t h e i r  in tended  u se .  China annua l ly  
produces s e v e r a l  hundred type-59 medium t anks  ( c o p i e s  of  t h e  Sov ie t  
T-54) and a  sma l l  number of  Chinese-designed armored personnel  c a r r i e r s  
and l i g h t  t a n k s .  The f i e l d  a r t i l l e r y  i n v e n t o r y  of  16,000 weapons i n -  
c l u d e s  guns w i th  c a l i b e r s  of  up t o  130 mm, howi t ze r s  o f  up t o  152 mm, 
and a  growing number of m u l t i p l e  r o c k e t  l aunche r s .  
The Chinese produce a  wide v a r i e t y  o f  rud imentary  p r o t e c t i v e  
equipment f o r  chemical  and b i o l o g i c a l  d e f e n s e s ,  and they  emphasize 
i t s  use  i n  t r a i n i n g .  They have t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  ba se  and t e c h n i c a l  
competence t o  produce chemical  wa r f a r e  a g e n t s ,  bu t  i t  i s  n o t  known 
i f  t h e y  have s t o c k p i l e d  l a r g e  amounts. There i s  no ev idence  i n d i c a t i n g  
t h a t  China h a s  an o f f e n s i v e  b i o l o g i c a l  w a r f a r e  c a p a b i l i t y .  
The ground f o r c e s  a r e  seen  a s  r e q u i r i n g  major  improvement i n  s e v e r a l  
a r e a s  i n c l u d i n g  an t i a rmor  weapons, p a r t i c u l a r l y  a n t i t a n k  guided  m i s s i l e s ;  
t a c t i c a l  a i r  de f ense  weapons, i n c l u d i n g  mobi le  m i s s i l e s  and r a d a r - d i r e c t e d ,  
r a p i d - f i r e  guns;  and g e n e r a l  t r a n s p o r t  f o r  equipment and t r o o p s .  
4. A i r  Force  
C h i n a ' s  A i r  Force ha s  around 6 ,000  combat a i r c r a f t .  It i s  s e v e r e l y  
l i m i t e d ,  however, by a  l a c k  of  modern p l a n e s  and s o p h i s t i c a t e d  weapons. 
It i s  p r i m a r i l y  a  d e f e n s i v e  f o r c e s ,  and i t s  a i r c r a f t  a r e  based on S o v i e t  
t echnology .  Only a  ve ry  smal l  pe r cen t age  o f  t h e  roughly  4,500 a i r  d e f e n s e  
f i g h t e r s  a r e  MIG-21s; t h e  remainder  a r e  MIG-19s o r  o l d e r  models .  
The a i r  f o r c e  h a s  about  1 ,000 t a c t i c a l  bombers; some 400 a r e  Chinese-  
des igned  F-9 f i g h t e r  bombers, and ano the r  450 a r e  IL-28 l i g h t  bombers 
of  S o v i e t  de s ign .  A l l  have r e l a t i v e l y  s h o r t  r anges  and sma l l  bomb l o a d s  
( i n  comparison wi th  U.S. a i r c r a f t  and late-model Sov ie t  p l a n e s ) .  Ch ina ' s  
90 TU-16s can  be used i n  a  s t r a t e g i c  r o l e ,  b u t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  known t o  have 
a i r - t o - s u r f a c e  m i s s i l e s  and e l e c t r o n i c  countermeasure  equipment and a r e  
h i g h l y  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  modern i n t e r c e p t o r s  and s u r f a c e - t o - a i r  m i s s i l e s .  
Few Chinese combat a i r c r a f t  have t h e  gea r  r e q u i r e d  f o r  combat d u r i n g  
adve r se  weather .  
China manufac tures  MIG-19s, MIG-2ls, IL-28s, F-9s and TU-16s. It h a s  
produced ove r  h a l f  o f  t h e  MIG-21s i n  i t s  i n v e n t o r y ,  b u t  manufac tu r ing  problems,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i th  t h e  e n g i n e s ,  have caused t h e  MIG-21 program t o  proceed 
h a l t i n g l y .  I n  l a t e  1975 China brought  Spey j e t  eng ines  and technology  from 
B r i t a i n .  These presumably w i l l  improve C h i n a ' s  a e r o n a u t i c a l  i n d u s t r y ,  
~y t h e  middle  o f  t h e  1980s ,  b u t  u n t i l  t hen  t h e  A i r  Force must r e l y  on t h e  
technology  and p roduc t ion  i t  now h a s .  The Spey eng ine  i s  n o t  s u i t a b l e  f o r  
use  i n  t h e  MIG-21 a s  i t  i s  c u r r e n t l y  con f igu red .  
5.  A i r  Defense 
The ground-based a i r  d e f e n s e s  c o n s i s t  o f  thousands  of  a n t i a i r c r a f t  guns 
and s e v e r a l  hundred s u r f a c e - t o - a i r  m i s s i l e  l aunche r s  ( t h e  CSA-1, a  v e r s i o n  
of t h e  S o v i e t  SA-2). These de fense s  a r e  thought  t o  be deployed p r i m a r i l y  
around urban and i n d u s t r i a l  c e n t e r s  and c r i t i c a l  m i l i t a r y  f a c i l i t i e s .  
C h i n a ' s  a i r  s u r v e i l l a n c e  network p rov ides  some e a r l y  warning coverage 
a t  medium and h igh  a l t i t u d e s  b u t  ha s  many gaps a t  low a l t i t u d e s .  The 
couunand and c o n t r o l  system i s  i n e f f i c i e n t ,  and i t s  personnel  l a c k  expe r i -  
ence  i n  o p e r a t i n g  i n  an e l e c t r o n i c  countermeasure environment .  The coun t ry  
i s  h i g h l y  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  low-level p e n e t r a t i o n  by a  l a r g e  f o r c e  o f  modern 
a i r c r a f t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  d u r i n g  adverse  weather .  By v i r t u e  of  t h e i r  numbers, 
however, t h e  Chinese f i g h t e r s  ( i n  combinat ion w i th  ground-based a i r  d e f e n s e s )  
could  i n f l i c t  s i g n i f i c a n t  c a s u a l t i e s  (g iven  t ime and good wea the r )  on enemy 
a i r c r a f t  f l y i n g  a t  low t o  medium a l t i t u d e .  
6. Navy 
Already  an e f f e c t i v e  c o a s t a l  de f ense  f o r c e ,  t h e  350,000-man Navy i s  
beg inning  a  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  a  deep-water f o r c e .  It  i s  o rgan i zed  i n t o  t h e  
North Sea ,  Eas t  Sea and South Sea F l e e t s .  Each has  bo th  s u r f a c e  s h i p s  and 
submarines a s s igned  t o  i t .  
The Navy h a s  more than  2,000 v e s s e l s ,  i n c l u d i n g  hundreds of  c o a s t a l  
p a t r o l  c r a f t ,  a  number of  amphibious s h i p s  and l and ing  c r a f t ,  over  200 
m i s s i l e  b o a t s  and s e v e r a l  hundred a u x i l i a r i e s .  The Navy h a s  on ly  38 major  
s u r f a c e  wa r sh ip s ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  of which a r e  d e s t r o y e r s .  Most o f  t h e s e  su r -  
f a c e  s h i p s  a r e  armed wi th  S tyx  ( S o v i e t )  a n t i s h i p  c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s ,  b u t  t h e y  
depend on t h e i r  guns f o r  a n t i a i r c r a f t  p r o t e c t i o n .  
Of t h e  Navy's 99 o p e r a t i o n a l  submar ines ,  a l l  b u t  two a r e  diesel-powered 
t o rpedo  a t t a c k  submarines.  One i s  an o l d  G-class submarine,  a p p a r e n t l y  
modi f ied  i n t o  a  t e s t  p l a t fo rm f o r  C h i n a ' s  SLBM. The o t h e r  one i s  a  Han- 
c l a s s  nuclear-powered a t t a c k  submarine t h a t  was launched i n  1970.  A 
second Han-class submarine i s  now s a i d  t o  be undergoing s e a  t r i a l s .  
Over t h e  l a s t  s e v e r a l  y e a r s ,  nava l  s h i p b u i l d i n g  and mar i t ime  opera-  
t i o n s  have demons t ra ted  P e k i n g ' s  i n t e n t i o n  t o  p r o j e c t  t h e  Navy's p r e sence  
beyond c o a s t a l  wa t e r s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  b u i l d i n g  m i s s i l e  b o a t s  and sub- 
mar ines  f o r  c o a s t a l  d e f e n s e ,  t h e  Chinese have expanded t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  
of l a r g e  s u r f a c e  wa r sh ip s ,  i n c l u d i n g  d e s t r o y e r s  ( t h e  Luta  c l a s s )  and f r i g a t e s  
( t h e  Kiang-hu c l a s s ) .  They a l s o  a r e  working on n a v a l  suppor t  s h i p s  f o r  
d i s t a n t  o p e r a t i o n s .  I n  t h e  p a s t  few y e a r s  Chinese oceanographic  r e s e a r c h  
s h i p s  have conducted long-range c r u i s e s  t o  t h e  southwest  P a c i f i c ,  c o l l e c t i n g  
t e c h n i c a l  d a t a  needed t o  o p e r a t e  i n  t h e  open ocean .  
Chinese nava l  s h i p s  a r e  s een  a s  having  major  shor tcomings  i n  
an t i submar ine  wa r f a r e  and a i r  d e f e n s e .  The i r  o b s o l e s c e n t  ASW d e t e c t i o n  
equipment and weapons system a r e  r ea sonab ly  e f f e c t i v e  i n  sha l l ow  c o a s t a l  
wa t e r s  but  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n  t h e  open ocean .  For a i r  d e f e n s e ,  t h e  s h i p s  
must depend on t h e i r  guns,  u n l e s s  t h e y  a r e  w i t h i n  range  of  shore-based 
p l a n e s .  
C. Modern iza t ion  
China i s  w e l l  aware of  i t s  m i l i t a r y  shortcomings and s i n c e  about  1975 
h a s  renewed i t s  e f f o r t s  t o  improve and modernize i t s  armed f o r c e s .  The 
long-term program p l a c e s  emphasis bo th  on improving t h e  q u a l i t y  and 
combat s k i l l s  o f  t r o o p s  and on a c q u i r i n g  modern arms. The Chinese can- 
no t  deve lop  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  weapons q u i c k l y ,  and t hey  almost  c e r t a i n l y  
f o r e s e e  a  g r a d u a l  weakening r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  S o v i e t s  u n l e s s  t hey  
begin  arming t h e i r  f o r c e s  w i th  modern weapons. The re fo re ,  t h e  Chinese 
a r e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  buying advanced conven t iona l  weapons and r e l a t e d  
technology  from t h e  West. They cannot  a f f o r d  t o  buy eve ry th ing  t hey  
need ,  however, and have adopted an appa ren t  s t r a t e g y  o f  buying l i m i t e d  
q u a n t i t i e s  o f  modern equipment o u t r i g h t ,  and i n  a d d i t i o n  a c q u i r i n g  t h e  
technology  and l i c e n s i n g  r i g h t s  t o  produce and deve lop  them d o m e s t i c a l l y .  
The Chinese seem most e age r  t o  procure  such equipment a s  a n t i - t a n k  
m i s s i l e s ,  a n t i - a i r c r a f t  m i s s i l e s ,  a i r c r a f t ,  a n t i - s h i p  m i s s i l e s ,  a n t i -  
submarine wa r f a r e  equipment and d i e s e l  marine eng ines ,  bu t  few d e a l s  
a r e  known t o  have been completed.  Purchases  of  Western m i l i t a r y  equipment 
a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  have any major  impact on Ch ina ' s  f o r c e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  soon.  
China would need many y e a r s  t o  f i e l d  modern weapons i n  l a r g e  numbers, 
t o  e s t a b l i s h  a  suppor t  s t r u c t u r e  t o  s u s t a i n  them, and t o  t r a i n  pe r sonne l  
i n  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n .  Because most o f  t h e  weapons they  a r e  seek ing  a r e  
u n l i k e  any t hey  now have ,  t h e  Chinese would need t o  make major changes 
i n  t h e i r  f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e  b e f o r e  t hey  could e f f e c t i v e l y  i n t e g r a t e  t h e  
weapons i n t o  o p e r a t i o n a l  u n i t s .  
Uni t s  s t a t i o n e d  a long  t he  Sino-Soviet  bo rde r  would l i k e l y  g e t  t h e  
new weapons f i r s t .  Modern weapons would enhance t h e i r  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ;  
b u t  no s i n g l e  conven t iona l  weapon system would s i g n i f i c a n t l y  change 
t h e  c u r r e n t  m i l i t a r y  s i t u a t i o n  on t h e  Sino-Soviet  b o r d e r .  
11. The Sino-Soviet  M i l i t a r y  Balance 
China h a s  i d e n t i f i e d  t h e  S o v i e t  Union a s  i t s  most dangerous 
p o t e n t i a l  adve r sa ry .  Both c o u n t r i e s  m a i n t a i n  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n  
of t h e i r  f o r c e s  a long  t h e  b o r d e r ;  bo th  keep t h e i r  f o r c e s  i n  an essen-  
t i a l l y  d e f e n s i v e  p o s t u r e ;  and a  conven t iona l  war would b e  r i s k y  and 
c o s t l y  f o r  bo th .  
Chinese conven t iona l  f o r c e s  could  make on ly  sha l l ow  i n c u r s i o n s  
i n t o  S o v i e t  t e r r i t o r y .  Sov ie t  f o r c e s  and s t r o n g  f i x e d  d e f e n s e s  a r e  
capab l e  of h a l t i n g  an i n v a s i o n .  Sov ie t  t r o o p s  i nvad ing  China would 
meet f o r c e s  t h a t  a r e  o r g a n i z e d ,  equipped and deployed f o r  a  nonnuc l ea r  
d e f e n s e .  The Chinese a r e  seen a s  having  a  r e a s o n a b l e  chance o f  s t a l e -  
mat ing  a  Sov ie t  conven t iona l  a t t a c k  b e f o r e  i t  reached  t h e  North China 
p l a i n .  
Should h o s t i l i t i e s  e s c a l a t e  t o  t h e  use  of  n u c l e a r  weapons, China 
would be  no match f o r  t h e  USSR. None the l e s s ,  i f  t h e y  could  launch  t h e i r  
n u c l e a r  f o r c e s ,  t h e  Chinese could  d e v a s t a t e  t h e  S o v i e t s  ' urban  suppor t  
ba se s  i n  t h e  Far  Eas t  and make i t  d i f f i c u l t  f o r  s u r v i v i n g  Sov ie t  m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e s  t o  s u s t a i n  o p e r a t i o n s .  
A.  Ground Fo rces  
The Chinese have p o s i t i o n e d  about  1 . 5  m i l l i o n  men i n  t h e  f o u r  m i l i t a r y  
r e g i o n s  a d j a c e n t  t o  t h e  b o r d e r .  Most o f  t h e  t r o o p s  a r e  infantry--around 
i O O  d i v i s i o n s ;  t h e  t ank  d i v i s i o n s  i n  t h e  a r e a  number n i n e .  V i r t u a l l y  a l l  
t h e  combat u n i t s  a r e  f u l l y  manned and equipped.  Most o f  them a r e  l o c a t e d  
n e a r  t h e  f i r s t  d e f e n s i b l e  t e r r a i n  we l l  back from t h e  bo rde r .  
The USSR m a i n t a i n s  over  400,000 men ( abou t  a  q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  
ground f o r c e s )  i n  t h e  bo rde r  d i s t r i c t s  and i n  Mongolia. Most o f  t h e  
40-odd d i v i s i o n s  a r e  motorized r i f l e  u n i t s  wi th  s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts of  
armor; t h e y  have more t h a n  10,000 t anks .  Many of  t h e  Sov ie t  d i v i s i o n s  
( u n l i k e  t he  Chinese)  a r e  under s t r e n g t h .  
The S o v i e t s  could  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  combat f o r c e s  t o  about  1 m i l l i o n  
men by f u l l y  m o b i l i z i n g  t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  i n  t h e  Far  Eas t  a l o n e .  They 
probably  cou ld  n o t  beg in  major  o f f e n s i v e  o p e r a t i o n s  f o r  a t  l e a s t  a  
week, and f u l l  m o b i l i z a t i o n  of t h e  suppor t  s t r u c t u r e  would t ake  l o n g e r .  
B. A i r  Fo rce s  and A i r  Defense 
The Chinese en joy  an edge i n  t h e  number of  combat a i r c r a f t  a l ong  
t h e  bo rde r  b u t  most Sov ie t  a i r c r a f t  a r e  f a r  s u p e r i o r  t o  and b e t t e r  armed 
than  t hose  of  China,  and Sov ie t  p i l o t s  r e c e i v e  more t r a i n i n g .  The S o v i e t s  
a l s o  have armed h e l i c o p t e r s  t h a t  would provide  f i r e  suppor t  t o  ground 
f o r c e  u n i t s ,  wh i l e  t h e  Chinese have no th ing  comparable .  
S o v i e t  ground f o r c e  u n i t s  have one o f  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  a r r a y  of  
a i r  de f ense  weapons i n  t he  world.  The number, d i v e r s i t y  and s o p h i s t i c a -  
t i o n  of  t h e i r  a i r  de f ense  m i s s i l e s  and guns would i n f l i c t  heavy l o s s e s  
on any Chinese a i r  a t t a c k .  Chinese ground f o r c e s  must depend on a  l a r g e  
number of  f i g h t e r  p l anes  and towed a n t i a i r c r a f t  guns f o r  de f ense .  Over 
t ime ,  Chinese f i g h t e r s  and ground-based a i r  de f ense s  could t a k e  a  s i g n i -  
f i c a n t  t o l l  on enemy a i r c r a f t ,  bu t  t h e  S o v i e t s  s t i l l  could  e s t a b l i s h  
l o c a l  a i r  s u p e r i o r i t y .  
C. Sino-Soviet  Border  War 
The t h r e a t  o f  war between China and t h e  USSR h a s  dimished s i n c e  
t h e  bo rde r  c l a s h e s  and S o v i e t s  h i n t s  o f  p reempt ive  n u c l e a r  s t r i k e  i n  
1969. Although a  g r a d u a l  S o v i e t  m i l i t a r y  b u i l d u p  i n  t h e  Fa r  E a s t  h a s  
been ongoing s i n c e  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 6 0 ' ~ ~  i t  a p p a r e n t l y  was n o t  viewed i n  
Peking a s  a  s e r i o u s  t h r e a t  o r  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  a l t e r a t i o n  of  t h e  f o r c e s  
ba l ance .  Peking appeared c o n t e n t  t o  c o n t i n u e  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  war 
of words, n o t  f e a r i n g  t h a t  t h i n g s  might d e t e r i o r a t e  i n t o  a  m i l i t a r y  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n .  They genu ine ly  seemed t o  have been  caught  o f f  guard  
when t h e  bo rde r  sk i rmi shes  e s c a l a t e d ,  and t h e  t h r e a t  o f  a  major  war 
w i th  t h e  Sov ie t  Union loomed l a r g e .  Once t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  t h r e a t  
was r ecogn ized ,  however, Peking moved q u i c k l y  t o  a m e l i o r a t e  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
and reduce  t e n s i o n s .  The f i r s t  s t e p  was t o  a g r e e  t o  face- to- face  t a l k s  
w i th  t h e  S o v i e t s  a t  t h e  Peking a i r p o r t  i n  September 1969. 
Almost immediately t h e r e a f t e r  a  r e o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  PLA commenced 
g r e a t l y  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  t h e  n o r t h e r n  b o r d e r .  These moves s h i f t e d  t h e  focus  
o f  t h e  PLA's de fense s  from seaward approaches  t o  t h e  concept  o f  a l l -  
around d e f e n s e .  I n  t h e  p roces s  a  l a r g e  number of f o r c e s  were r e p o s i t i o n e d ,  
new u n i t s  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  and t h e  p roduc t ion  of  m i l i t a r y  weapons and equip-  
ment i n c r e a s e d  d r a m a t i c a l l y .  
I n  1971 Pek ing ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  of  t h e  imminence o f  h o s t i l i t i e s  appeared  
t o  have been s h a r p l y  reduced ,  however. The f r a n t i c  pace  o f  developments  
of  t h e  e a r l i e r  pe r iod  was r e p l a c e d  by programs des igned  f o r  t h e  l ong  haul-- 
a l b e i t  i n  a  new t h r e a t  environment--and con t inued  improvement on i t s  m i l i t a r y  
p r e p a r a t i o n s .  I n  a  r e l a t e d  development t h e  beg inn ings  of  a  new e r a  i n  
Sino-United S t a t e s  r e l a t i o n s  dawned t h a t  e v e n t u a l l y  would l e ad  t o  t h e  
d r ama t i c  breakthrough i n  1972 a t  Shanghai .  
The PLA i s  much b e t t e r  p repared  t o  d e a l  w i th  a  Sov ie t  conven t iona l  
a t t a c k  today  t han  i t  was i n  1969, bu t  would s u f f e r  from d i s t i n c t  d i sadvan-  
t a g e s  on a  n u c l e a r  o r  chemical  b a t t l e f i e l d .  I n  a  conven t iona l  war t h e  
Chinese probably  could s t o p  a  S o v i e t  o f f e n s i v e  b e f o r e  a l l  of Manchuria 
was l o s t .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand, a  PLA c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e  t o  d i s l o d g e  t h e  
USSR from Chinese t e r r i t o r y  probably  would a l s o  f a i l .  Such a  s t a l e m a t e  
l e a d i n g  t o  a  war of  a t t r i t i o n  would f avo r  t h e  Chinese.  Any Sov ie t  
a t tempt  t o  occupy and p a c i f y  a  h o s t i l e  t e r r i t o r y  v i r t u a l l y  t h e  s i z e  
of  Western Europe would s u r e l y  pose almost  insurmountab le  d i f f i c u l t  
and l ead  t o  a  massive d r a i n  on Sov ie t  manpower and r e s o u r c e s .  
The Sov ie t  p o s t u r e  a long  t h e  bo rde r  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  many 
s i m i l a r i t i e s  between cont ingency  p lanning  f o r  war i n  Europe and t h e  
Far  E a s t .  That i s ,  a  f i r s t  campaign-- last ing approximate ly  60 days-- 
would c o n c e n t r a t e  on r a p i d l y  over running  t h e  n o r t h e r n  h a l f  o f  Manchuria 
wh i l e  a  l e s s e r  f o r c e  marched i n t o  C h i n a ' s  no r thwes t e rn  p rov ince ,  Sin- 
k i ang .  Forces  pushing sou th  from Manchuria would l i n k  up wi th  a  f o r c e  
from Mongolia speeding  toward Peking i n  a  second 60-day campaign cap- 
t u r i n g  a l l  of North China i n  a  s t r a t e g i c  p i n c e r s  movement. 
To b l u n t  such a  Sov ie t  o f f e n s i v e ,  t h e  PLA has  coun te r ed  wi th  a  
de fense  i n  dep th .  Along major  avenues of approach on t h e  f i r s t  defen-  
s i b l e  t e r r a i n ,  l o c a l  f o r c e  u n i t s  would l i k e l y  engage i n  p o s i t i o n a l  o r  
t r e n c h  w a r f a r e .  Once t h e s e  o b s t a c l e s  were overcome, Sov ie t  f o r c e s  would 
encoun te r  e v e r  i n c r e a s i n g  numbers of  C h i n a ' s  b e s t  main f o r c e  d i v i s i o n s .  
Although t h e  S o v i e t s  p robably  would ove r run  t h e  d i v i s i o n s  t h e y  met on 
t h e  Manchurian p l a i n ,  t h e  b u l k  o f  t h e  PLA would remain uncommitted i n  
t e r r a i n  move f a v o r a b l e  t o  t h e  l e s s  mobi le  Chinese u n i t s  i n  s o u t h e r n  
Manchuria.  It i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  d i s l o d g e  t h e s e  u n i t s  b e f o r e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  
l i n k u p  of f o r c e s  i s  ach ieved  i n  t h e  a l l  impor t an t  second campaign. 
Moreover,  t h e  t ime  e l a p s e d  would g i v e  t h e  Chinese t ime t o  draw down 
f o r c e s  from o t h e r  a r e a s  and move them t o  s t a g i n g  and r e s e r v e  p o s i t i o n s  
f a r t h e r  n o r t h .  
The outcome of t h e  a i r  war i n  such a  c o n f l i c t  i s  o f  c o u r s e  a  c r u c i a l  
v a r i a b l e .  I n  an  a l l  o u t  c o n t e s t  f o r  a i r  s u p e r i o r i t y ,  t h e  S o v i e t s  sophi-  
s t i c a t e d  a i r c r a f t  and compara t ive ly  b e t t e r  t r a i n e d  p i l o t s  would o f f s e t  
C h i n a ' s  numer ica l  advantage .  Peking appea r s  t o  r e a l i z e  t h i s ,  and t h u s ,  
i f  p o s s i b l e ,  would avoid  c o n f r o n t i n g  d i r e c t l y  S o v i e t  a i rpower .  I n s t e a d ,  
t h e  Chinese a p p a r e n t l y  p l an  t o  husband t h e i r  r e s o u r c e s  a s  long  a s  p o s s i b l e  
and a t t a c k  on ly  when they  b e l i e v e  t h e  odds a r e  f a v o r a b l e  o r  when d i c t a t e d  
b y  a  requi rement  t o  s u p p o r t  ground o p e r a t i o n s .  The Chinese  cannot  expec t  
g r e a t  succes s  w i th  such t a c t i c s ,  b u t  t hey  may b e l i e v e  t h a t  a  number of  
s m a l l  l o c a l  v i c t o r i e s  w i l l  g i v e  t h e  ground f o r c e s  j u s t  enough a i r  suppo r t  
t o  s u s t a i n  combat u n t i l  t h e  S o v i e t  o f f e n s i v e  i s  s t a l l e d .  
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